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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed by three essays that explore the relationship between good IT
governance and effective information security services. Governance steers and verifies
performance of fiduciary duties, through the implementation of proper governance mechanisms.
With a focus on information security, this essay presents three categories of governance
mechanisms – process-based, structural, and relational. When properly instituted, they work
together to ensure that IT understands business requirements for information security and strives
to fulfill them. An explanation is offered about the efficacy of those mechanisms, based on an
agency theory perspective that views IT as an agent for business. The two underlying causes for
agency problems are goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and the
principal. Governance mechanisms help to reduce both goal incongruence and information
asymmetry. Hence, they lead to desired outcomes. A theoretical framework is presented and
empirical tested.
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CHAPTER 1 WHAT COLOR IS YOUR ARCHETYPE? GOVERNANCE
PATTERNS FOR INFORMATION SECURITY
Security managers have long lamented the lack of top management support, insufficient budget
for tooling up security, the proverbial user who just can’t refrain from opening the suspicious
email attachment, and so on. But now senior managers are taking their refrains more seriously.
Among other things, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has catapulted discussion about accountability for
information security onto the agenda of boards of directors meetings. These boards are
recognizing the importance of IT governance for ensuring information security and enhancing
accountability. It is not a matter of whether, but when and how, companies should bring
information security under the umbrella of IT governance. This paper provides a perspective on
making governance decisions about information security.

IT governance aligns the actions of IT staff with business goals through monitoring and
empowerment. Empowerment comes from granting the right to make decisions. However, it
should not be done randomly or on a whim. It requires carefully allocating decision rights for
given areas of responsibilities.

Herbert Simon (1960) suggests that the nature of decisions dictates where each important class of
organizational decisions should be made. Neither centralizing nor decentralizing decision
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making is always a good thing. Rather a company must delegate the “natural subdivision” for
each major decision.

Weill and Ross (2004) revisit Simon when they define IT governance as “specifying the decision
rights and accountability framework to encourage desirable behavior in using IT (p. 2).” Weill
and Ross categorize IT decisions into five major classes: IT principles, IT architecture, IT
infrastructure, business application needs, and IT investment and prioritization. Their study of
256 enterprises shows that high performing companies use the proper decision right allocation
pattern for each major class of IT decisions.

Weill and Ross use political archetypes to accentuate differences among allocation patterns.
Table 1.1 summarizes prescribed decision rights allocations for each archetype. Business
monarchy and feudal archetypes place business executives or business unit heads, respectively,
at the helm when it comes to security decisions. With the federal archetype both the business
unit and corporate management hold decision rights. In contrast, the IT monarchy puts
information security decisions squarely on the shoulders of the IT professionals. In the IT
duopoly decisions are made by both IT executives and business executives/leaders, while no IT
governance is practiced with anarchy.

For security professionals looking for solutions to problems they encounter, this framework
provides a new perspective – a mismatch between decision rights and decision class. For
example, one common sin is treating information security solely as a technical issue and forcing
2

security-related organizational or human decisions upon reluctant IT “techies” who are illequipped for making such decisions.

Table 1.1 Weill and Ross IT Governance Archetypes

Archetype

Decision Right
Distribution

Explanation about the Role of IT

Business
monarchy

Senior business executives
make IT decisions for the
entire enterprise. The IT
executive is considered as
one voice in the decision
making.

IT monarchy

IT professionals make the IT IT can be implemented in many different
decisions.
flavors, involving IT professionals at corporate
IT or business unit IT to variable degrees.

Feudal

Business unit management
makes IT decisions.

Either corporate IT or business unit IT or both
can be involved in decision making as well.

Federal

Involving both the corporate
center and business units.

Either corporate IT or business unit IT or both
can be involved in decision making as well.

IT duopoly

Decisions are made by the
duo of IT executives and
either corporate business
executives or business unit
leaders.

This archetype also incarnate in one of these
two forms:
(a) “Bicycle wheel” with the corporate IT at the
hub. Sitting at the rim are the business units,
each of which forms a spoke together with the
hub; or
(b) “T” arrangement, with the IT executive
having overlapping memberships in an
executive committee and an IT committee.

Anarchy

No IT governance.

Business executives make the decisions about
with security with the corporate IT head, the
CIO, as an equal partner with other executives.

No single governance archetype provides a one-size-fits-all pattern for security decision making.
Weill and Ross’ framework treats “security and risk” merely as a cluster in “IT infrastructure
services.” We think this classification is too narrow and instead propose that IT security affects
the entire IT gamut. We illustrate our point by discussing six critical success factors (CSF) for
3

information security that are frequently discussed in the security literature. We identify the most
suitable governance archetype for each CSF class.

1.1 CSF 1: Information Security Strategy – IT Principles
A company’s information security strategy “is a related set of high-level statements about how
IT is used in the business (Weill and Ross, 2004, p. 27).” It is built upon such IT principles as
protecting the confidentiality of customer information, strict compliance with regulations,
maintaining a security baseline that is above the industry benchmark, etc. (Egan, 2005).

Security strategies of companies in the same line of business may differ dramatically. For
instance, a software company’s strategy may aggressively value time-to-market over security
when building its products. It may alternatively be paranoid about secure coding. Microsoft had
adopted the first strategy for a long time. After enough criticisms were leveled, it decided to
adopt a different strategy with its Trustworthy Computing initiative that aims to be “secure by
design, secure by default, secure in deployment” (Wylder, 2004). While Microsoft Windows has
long been associated with lax security, Java’s security record is impressive and seems to be an
outcome of Sun’s strategy to bake security into the product from day one.

Security strategy is hardly a technical decision. It is often defined based on the company’s
mission, overall strategy, business model, and the demands of its business environment.
Deciding on the security strategy, therefore, requires decision makers who thoroughly
4

understand the company’s strategic view and management system (LeVeque, 2006). In contrast,
decision makers need not be well-versed in information security implementation. Thus, a
business monarchy is a good match for such situations in which the top business executives set
the tone for the company’s security. As part of the business monarchy’s “ruling class,” the CIO
handles the reality check of the decided security strategy. If necessary, the IT function provides
the required technical input for supporting the decision.

1.2 CSFs 2 & 3: Security Policies and Technical Architecture – IT Architecture
These two CSF deal with IT architecture, or “the organizing logic for data, applications, and
infrastructure, captured in a set of policies, relationships, and technical choices to achieve desired
business and technical standardization and integration (Weill and Ross, 2004, p. 30)."

CSF 2 is concerned with logical, business-oriented architecture. Architecture supports the
standardization and integration requirements based on a company’s business strategy (Ross,
Weill, and Robertson, 2006; Weill and Ross, 2004). Standardization ensures the uniformity that
encourages efficient business processes. Integration builds on uniform data definition to allow
sharing of data across business processes, thus enhancing efficiency, coordination, and agility
(Ross et al, 2006).

Security policies, a critical success factor, encourage standardization and integration. Following
best practices, they broadly define the scope of and overall expectations for the company’s
5

information security program. From these, lower-level policies are derived to control specific
security areas (e.g., Internet use, access control, etc.) and/or individual applications (e.g., payroll
systems, telecom systems, etc.) (Peltier, 2004). A goal of security policies is standardizing
behavior. Supplemented by security standards, guidelines, and procedures, policies maintain
standardized employee behaviors where security is concerned (Tudor, 2001).

Among the various policies, information asset classification policy particularly helps integration.
Asset classification is an important first step for security programs because it informs company
decisions about which information assets to protect. Although it does not target integration
directly, the exercise of identifying, categorizing, and entrusting information assets with
responsible parties greatly facilitates data standardization and sharing.

Weill and Ross (2004) observe that in many companies senior management relegates architecture
decisions to IT even though many high-level architecture decisions have substantial business
significance. Business leaders are needed to maintain a strategic business view (Ross et al,
2006). Still, IT leaders should not be excluded for two reasons. First, their judgment prevents
unrealistic goals for standardization and integration. Second, policy decisions require the ability
to analyze the technical and security implications of user behaviors and business processes.
Thus, for high-level security architecture decisions, IT duopoly is a good fit.

CSF 3 is the ‘technical security architecture’ (e.g., Panko, 2004). It provides the organizing logic
for security infrastructure components and focuses on designing a company’s network and
6

security topology. For instance, a very widely used security typology is demilitarized zones
(DMZs). DMZs provide a buffer between the public, presumably hostile, Internet and the
company’s internal networks. DMZ design calls for a series of decisions on firewall setup and
server configuration so that they can be placed strategically to form a DMZ. In a larger picture,
DMZs are part of a layered protection architecture whose design involves numerous technical
decisions. DMZs require a high level of technical expertise.

The matching archetype for this CSF is fairly straightforward. Having business leaders make
technical architecture decisions is not only micromanagement, but also infeasible because they
lack the technical know-how. IT monarchy fits these decisions well because only IT managers
have the technical expertise to design and implement such systems.

1.3 CSF 4: Information Security Infrastructure – IT Infrastructure
"IT infrastructure is the shared and reliable services used by multiple applications (Weill and
Ross, 2004).” Security infrastructure provides protection by arranging security mechanisms
according to the security architecture specifications.

The most conspicuous mechanisms are those directly related to security. Firewalls, intrusion
detection systems (IDSs), encryption devices are the most popular examples. Many mechanisms
are either hardware or software solutions. The hardware often has some performance advantage,
while software offers richer functionality. The other major part of infrastructure is built by
7

hardening existing network infrastructure components and computing platforms. For instance,
the primary function of routers and switches is to provide network connectivity. However, they
can act as the first line of defense with their security-related configuration such as access lists,
virtual LANs, etc.

Decisions in this class are concerned with technology selection and configuration. Common
objectives are to achieve consistency in protection, economy of scale, and synergy among the
components. For these reasons, corporate IT typically is responsible for managing the dedicated
security mechanisms. Also, general IT infrastructure such as enterprise network devices (the
second component above) often is centrally controlled by corporate IT. Thus, to use Simon’s
terminology, corporate IT is the “natural subdivision” for security infrastructure decisions. In
other words, the fitting governance pattern for these decisions is IT monarchy, where corporate
IT takes the lead.

1.4 CSF 5: Business Requirements for Security – Business Application Needs
IT architecture and infrastructure would be castles in the air if they did not serve business needs
and create value. Two conflicting objectives must be balanced when identifying a firm’s needs –
creativity and discipline. Creativity aims at new and more effective ways of delivering customer
value using IT. However, when necessary, a company should be ready to sacrifice creativity for
discipline (e.g. enforcing hardware or software standardization) so that architectural integrity can
be preserved (Weill and Ross, 2004).
8

Similarly, companies often must balance the enhanced information security gained from
adhering to security policies against productivity losses and user inconvenience. As security
attacks become more sophisticated, obeying security measures to deflect those attacks places
increased cognitive demands on users (e.g., long passwords with special characters for system
logon) and sacrifices productivity (e.g., the daily chore of scanning emails to spot phishing
attempts).

Identifying and fulfilling business users’ security requirements are essential for legitimate,
successful information security programs. Business requirements are the basis for writing
security policies. They also impact what security managers see as critical, but tough, challenges:
security training and user awareness. This is because when a training program is tied to the
unique requirements of individual business processes, it stands a better chance for effectiveness
and post-training retention.

Security requirements are determined by evaluating risks. This evaluation requires two key
inputs – the computing infrastructure and the way in which people use it to perform their jobs.
Perspectives from both IT and business are important in understanding the risks a company faces
and how to mitigate them (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003). This is a critical process during which
business users express what they want out of the information security program and how they
expect the security function to support their business activities. These requirements have
resounding effects as they will be incorporated into security policies and fulfilled with security
9

mechanisms. On the other hand, IT understands issues related to the IT infrastructure and what
are needed to keep it running. IT duopoly thus fits business application needs decisions best.
Such a governance pattern reconciles rivaling needs for security and achieves the delicate
security-productivity trade-off.

1.5 CSF 6: Information Security Investments – IT Investment and Prioritization
The “FUD factor” (fear, uncertainty, and doubt) used to be all that was needed to get top
management to plunk down money on information security. As information security becomes a
routine concern in daily operations, increasingly security managers need to justify their budget
requests financially. A recent empirical study (Gordon and Loeb, 2006) finds that companies are
starting to use the Net Present Value (NPV) method to make decisions about security spending.
According to the CSI/FBI (Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005) survey, 38% of the
respondents use Return on Investment (ROI) analysis, 18% use Net Present Value (NPV), and
19%, Internal Rate of Return (IRR) for IT security investments.

Of course, many more factors are at play when a company evaluates information security
investments. Qualitative cost-benefit assessments often supplement, or even substitute for, more
quantitative financial analytical methods. As when determining business needs, different units
within the company may have rival or conflicting “wishlists” for information security-related
purchases that benefit their unique needs. The IT function also should have a significant say in
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these decisions as it is in the best position to assess whether and how the investments may fit
with the company’s current IT infrastructure and application portfolio.

Thus, the most suitable governance pattern for investment and prioritization decisions is ITbusiness duopoly. In particular, the T-arrangement duopoly pattern (see Table 1.1) fits this type
of decision well. The most typical governance mechanism for this archetype is executive
committees/councils composed of business and IT executives, such as the IT steering committee
and budget committee, with the CIO having overlapping memberships in both. These committees
are the venue at which IT and business leaders make business cases for their proposed
investments and debate the merit and priorities of the investments. Decisions then are made with
the company’s best interest in mind.

1.6 Matching Archetypes with Decision Classes
We discussed six critical success factors for information security. For each, we suggested a
governance pattern that best suits decisions in that area (see Table 1.2 for a summary). These
decision class-archetype matches, however, are by no means etched in stone. Unique
organizational and environmental factors may require some deviation. For instance, it is easy to
imagine that business monarchy governs security investments decisions if a company
emphasizes stringent budget review and control from a pure business/financial perspective. At
enterprises with many relatively independent business units, a federal archetype that involves the
corporate center, business unit leaders, and IT leaders may be the proper archetype for business
11

requirement decisions. Alternatively, the corporate culture may even render a feudal archetype
the only choice.

That said, because of the nature of different IT decisions, each decision class lends itself best to
governance under a certain archetype. Wise companies know this and vary the governance
patterns for different decision classes. That is why Weill and Ross (2004) studied those 236
enterprises to identify the archetypes used by some of corporate America’s most successful
companies for governing IT decisions in the five classes. Their empirical data show that
organizations differ significantly in their selected archetypes for allocating decision rights for
different decision classes. For instance, duopoly is used by the largest portion (36%) of
organizations for IT principles decisions; for IT infrastructure decisions, IT monarchy (59%) is
the most popular.

Mismatched archetypes have negative security consequences. An example is the state
government described by Tudor (2001). The government includes 11 agencies and departments
and has adopted a feudal archetype for IT infrastructure decisions. This is an obvious mismatch
because IT monarchy typically is most proper for infrastructure decisions. Since decisions
regarding the infrastructural components are made in the 11 departments locally, duplications
abound; efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and communication suffer; and these create an
environment that makes efficient management of security infrastructure difficult. Tudor’s
prescription for this problem clearly targets the governance pattern: educate the department
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management on security; do not force security decisions on them; and provide incentive for the
departments to follow.

Governance patterns thus have significant implications for companies when assigning security
responsibilities and accountabilities. The taxonomy of decision classes lays out a logical way to
group key security decisions and ensure that all important bases are covered. The archetypes
clearly define the responsibilities of the major players in the company – business executives,
business unit leaders, corporate IT, business unit IT, etc. By matching the proper archetypes to
the key security decisions, the board of directors in effect puts the decisions in the hands of those
who are in the most appropriate positions for making quality decisions. In addition, decision
makers are truly empowered when they are bestowed the authority to make decisions that (1) are
suitable for their positions in the organizational hierarchy; (2) make the best use of their
expertise and knowledge; and (3) cater to the needs and specialization of the organization units
to which they belong.

Common, recurrent security problems (patchwork, shotgun approaches to security programs,
security policies copied from Information Security for Dummies, improper security mechanisms,
cookie-cutter security training programs, insufficient or lavish security investments, etc.) can all
be traced to not having the right decision makers. Therefore, for information security,
application of proper archetypes increases the chance that critical success factors are facilitated
with good decisions. Just as nations with healthy political systems grow and prosper,
information security programs under the governance of proper archetypes thrive. When security
13

managers present their cases to the board, citing IT Governance not only is easier for the
audience to understand but also may create more lasting effects than if they cite Hacking
Exposed.
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Table 1.2 Matching Information Security Decisions and Archetypes
Decision
Class

Information
Security
CSF

Symptoms of
Improper Decision
Right Allocation

Recommended
Archetype

Rationale

IT Principles

Security
strategy

Security is
afterthought and
patched on to
processes and
products.

Business
monarchy

Business leaders have
knowledge of company’s
strategies, which security
strategy should support.
No detailed technical
knowledge required.

IT
Architecture

Security
policies

Security policies are
written based on
theory and generic
templates.
Unenforceable due to
misfit with company’s
IT particularities.

IT duopoly

Requires ability to analyze
technical and security
implications of behaviors
and processes. Need to
know the particularities of
company’s IT
infrastructure.

Technical
security
architecture

Mis-specification of
security and network
typologies.

IT monopoly

Technical know-how is
needed.

IT
Infrastructure

Security
infrastructure

Selection of wrong,
ineffective security
mechanisms. Misconfiguration.
Ineffective technical
control.

IT monarchy

In-depth knowledge and
expertise needed.

Business
Application
Needs

Business
requirements
for security

Business needs not
supported by the
security program.
Users feel
inconvenienced and
bypass or undermine
security measures.
Poor result from user
training and
awareness programs.

IT duopoly

Security should provide
services to business
users. Needs to achieve
balance between security
and productivity.
Business inputs critical to
user training.

IT Investment
and
Prioritization

Investments Under- or overIT duopoly
in information investment in
security
information security.
Waste or insufficiency
in human or technical
resources for security.
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Requires financial
(quantitative) and
qualitative evaluation of
business impacts of
security investments.
Business case has to be
presented and debated for
rivaling projects.
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CHAPTER 2 AN AGENCY THEORY PERSPECTIVE ON IT
GOVERNANCE AND INFORMATION SECURITY SERVICES

2.1 Introduction
Information security (InfoSec) “is the protection of information and its critical elements,
including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information (Whitman and
Mattord, 2005, p. 8).” It is receiving greater attention recently, as the complexity of information
systems, the sophistication of security attacks, and the legal and financial consequences of
security breaches increase. Another reason is tightened regulations. For example, the enactment
of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) raises the bar for accountability related to information security.
To comply with SOX, public corporations need to manage information security to ensure that
financial, transactional, and audit data are accurate, securely stored, free of corruption, protected
from malicious access and modifications, and available for legitimate access (Symantec, 2004;
Volonino, Gessner, and Kermis, 2004). Failure to do so can result in prison terms and fines for
top executives, primarily the CEO and the CFO.

To protect business information, executives and business users rely on a number of information
security services (Grance, Hash, Stevens, O'Neal, and Bartol, 2003). For most firms, to date
internal IT has been the primary provider of these services, as the results from various surveys
show (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005, 2006; McKenna,
2002). If IT cannot provide effective information security services, the results can be costly, as
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evidenced by SOX’s penalties for non-compliance. This is because information security impacts
not just IT but also every facet of an organization. The board of directors and executive
management, therefore, should take the lead in ensuring that information security is managed
strategically. The information security function should be directed and controlled with a proper
governance framework (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2007).

Information security governance is an integral part of IT governance (ITGI, 2006; Posthumus
and von Solms, 2004; S. H. Von Solms, 2005). A natural question to ask is: how do we
implement IT governance so that IT is effective in providing information security services?
However, to date, the question is still largely unanswered by both the academic and practitioner
literature.

Academic research on security governance largely follows the traditional centralizeddecentralized-federal trichotomy of governance forms (e.g.,Warkentin and Johnston, 2006a,
2006b). We have yet to see security governance addressed from the angle of dynamic
governance mechanisms “such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams,
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000, p. 106).” The
practitioner’s literature on this topic tends to adopt a “checklist” (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001)
approach.

Thus, this essay tries to answer a set of questions that are of significance for both academic and
practitioner researchers:
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Does implementation of various IT governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of
information security services? Which type(s) of mechanisms are more critical for improving
information security?

To answer this question, this essay presents a trio of governance mechanism types and uses
agency theory to explain their efficacy in governing information security. Agency theory is
chosen as the theoretical basis because, in essence, the information security function acts as an
agent and provides security services to business departments, the principal. When agency
problems occur, the principal’s welfare suffers. In the context of information security, that
means the principal’s information assets are not sufficiently protected and the principal receives
suboptimal services. The various IT governance mechanisms tackle the two root causes for
agency problems: goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the principal and the
agent. This, in turn, leads to more effective information security services.

The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. First, IT’s role as provider of information security
services and effectiveness of InfoSec services are discussed. This is followed by a discussion of
agency relationship and agency problems in the context of information security function. Next,
IT governance and three types of governance mechanisms are presented. The last section
discusses how each type of these mechanisms can tackle the two root causes of agency problem
hence increasing the effectiveness of information security services.
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2.2 IT as InfoSec Service Provider
This essay studies information security governance through the perspective that IT is the
provider of information security service thus an agent for business users. IT is a staff function
that provides services to internal “customers” – other departments throughout the organization
(Pitt, Watson, and Kavan, 1995). It is particularly so when information security is concerned,
because the outcomes of InfoSec activities fit the characteristics of services as described by
Clark (1993):

(a)

Intangibility – InfoSec tasks do not usually produce physical goods. Although some
measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection systems often are implemented as
hardware thus visible, the absence of security breaches, rather the hardware itself, is the
true desired outcome;

(b)

Inseparability – InfoSec services are “sold” and then produced and consumed
simultaneously. The moment IT starts a protection measure, it is simultaneously used by
the internal customers.

(c)

Heterogeneity – because of the enormous array of technological platforms, applications,
data, threats, vulnerabilities, etc. and the variation in security personnel’s training and
experiences, each instance of security service is unique;

(d)

Perishability – InfoSec service cannot be stored; and
20

(e)

Non-transferability – When the service is rendered, there is no transfer of ownership.

Furthermore, IT can be construed as providing a subcategory of service (Clark, 1993), one that
adds value (security) to a tangible product (information assets). IT implements security
measures to protect both the information and the information systems on which information is
stored (for conciseness, this essay uses the term “information security” to refer to the protection
of both).

IT provides a variety of information security services (Grance et al, 2003). In its various special
publications (e.g., Grance et al, 2003), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
suggests a wide range of InfoSec services that address the following three aspects of InfoSec
protection:

(a)

Management – Services in this category aims to develop and maintain an organizationwide security program, formulate security policies, design the security architecture,
evaluate the effective security products, etc.

(b)

Operation – Services in this category handles important InfoSec operations such as
contingency planning, incident response, security testing, user training, etc.
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(c)

Technical – Services in this category are most often associated with IT when information
security is discussed, such as firewall configuration and management, intrusion detection
system design and monitoring, public key infrastructure (PKI) implementation, etc.

In theory, information security services can be offered by internal IT or external vendors (Grance
et al, 2003). In practice, however, industry surveys continuously show that only a very small
percentage of firms actually outsource their information security services and, even then, usually
only to a limited extent (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon et al, 2005, 2006; McKenna, 2002). Thus,
internal IT is the primary provider of a firm’s information security services.

The information security function normally is rested upon the IT department or IT personnel. Or
it can be a separate security organization, which often reports to the CIO or head of IT (Gentile,
Collette, and August, 2006). This essay uses the terms “IT”, “information security function,”
and “security organization” interchangeably to refer to the organizational unit or group that acts
as the provider of information security services. The terms “users,” “business,” and “user
departments” refer to other organizational units, users, managers, and executives that depend on
IT for protection of information assets.

2.3 Effectiveness of Information Security Services
The effectiveness of information security services is the extent to which the services are
delivered successfully. Its evaluation should have three focus points – business function,
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customers, and effective security. Thus, any metrics of effectiveness should include business
impact, service delivery, and the efficacy of implementation (Grance et al, 2003).

First, they ensure that the firm’s information assets are protected in terms of the widely accepted
criteria of security that are commonly referred to as the confidentiality-integrity-availability
(CIA) triad (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; B. Von Solms, 2005). Each of the attributes in the
CIA triad is defined as:

(a)

Confidentiality is the absence of unauthorized access, disclosure, and use of information
(Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; Avižienis, Laprie, Randell, and Landwehr, 2004; Snedaker,
2006; Wylder, 2004).

(b)

Integrity means that information is trustworthy and reliable because it has not been altered
or corrupted by unauthorized users or computer processes (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003;
Avižienis et al, 2004; Snedaker, 2006; Wylder, 2004). The unauthorized modification and
corruption can be either accidental or malicious (Gollmann, 2006).

(c)

Availability is the authorized users’ ability to have timely and reliable access to information
assets (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003; Avižienis et al, 2004; Snedaker, 2006; Wylder, 2004).
It is provided by fault-tolerant design and security measures preventing malicious attackers
from blocking legitimate access (Gollmann, 2006). Whereas confidentiality and integrity
usually concerns information or data, the scope of availability is more encompassing. It is
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also pertinent to other information assets such as servers, Internet connection, networks, etc.
(Snedaker, 2006).

Second, an important measurement of IT’s effectiveness is the quality of service it provides (Pitt
et al, 1995). Along the same line, internal “customers” of InfoSec services expect IT to provide
high quality services. IT should deliver reliable services, be responsive to users’ service requests,
be considerate with user requirements, perform services in a professional manner, etc. It is
suggested that quality is an important but overlooked aspect of information security (Snedaker,
2006).

Third, the security assurance provided by IT should support business users in their job function.
The increasing importance of information security in fact reflects firms’ high reliance on reliable
information. Any security breaches affect the reliability of information hence users’ productivity.

For information security services to be effective, ways are needed to ensure that IT performs
them with diligence. As “a theory of performance outcome (Nilakant, 1994 #103, p. 651,”
agency theory often is used as the theoretic foundation for analyzing quality of service providers
{e.g., Mills, 1990; Pontes, 1995; Singh and Sirdeshmukh, 2000). Therefore, to explain how IT
governance can improve InfoSec service effectiveness, this essay treats the relationship between
IT and users as that between an agent (IT) and a principal (users). Effectiveness is enhanced
when agency problems are reduced. IT governance is introduced as a means to achieve that end
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because governance is considered instrumental to controlling agency problems (Baiman, 1990;
Levinthal, 1988).

2.4 Agency Relationship in Information Security
When providing security services to the internal “customers,” the information security function
in essence acts as an agent for the principal, i.e., the business departments. An agency
relationship is present whenever “one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person
(the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision
making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p. 308).” The principal delegates the
task because of lack of time or ability to do the task (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). Similarly, user
departments need to delegate the provision of InfoSec services to IT because IT usually is the
only organizational unit that has the expertise and skills for it.

In an agency relationship, loss of principal’s welfare, or agency problems, often occurs. In other
words, the principal’s objectives may not be implemented in the principal’s best interest, due to
two agency problems: adverse selection and moral hazard. Adverse selection refers to the
agent’s exerting the inappropriate type of effort (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). In this situation, the
principal is unable to determine the agent’s qualifications and abilities (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Levinthal, 1988) and whether the agent’s decisions and actions are in the principal’s best interest
(Adams, 1994). For example, a security administrator may dismiss abnormal activities on
corporate network as transient peaks in traffic while the reality is that an attacker is scanning the
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network. Moral hazard means that the agent exercises inadequate effort. In this situation, the
principal is unable to verify the quantity and quality of the agent’s efforts (Mills, 1990). As an
example of moral hazard, a security administrator may dislike the mundane task of reviewing
logs from firewalls, intrusion detection systems, Windows operating systems, etc. She thus only
performs a cursory daily review of the log entries and sometimes skips the review altogether. In
both adverse selection and moral hazard scenarios, it is unlikely that business managers would
notice the security administrator’s suboptimal behaviors.

Agency problems stem from goal incongruence between the agent and the principal and the
principal’s difficulty in verifying the agent’s abilities and efforts due to asymmetric information
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Differences in training, experiences, work environment, and compensation
structure all contribute to the agent having different objectives than the principal’s when tackling
a task. Goal incongruence between the agent and the principal can result in reduction in
principal’s welfare (Nilakant and Rao, 1994).

The difficulty in verification is mostly the result of information asymmetry. Information
asymmetry refers to the agent “having private information to which the principal cannot
costlessly gain access. This private information may be with respect to the agent’s action choice
and/or state information (Baiman, 1990, p. 343).” First of all, there is expertise-based
asymmetry in that the agent possesses some domain knowledge, skills, and abilities that the
principal lacks. This asymmetry is in fact the raison d’être for agency relationships. Also, as the
agent works on the task, another type of asymmetry develops with respect to the knowledge
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about the agent’s actions, resources needed for the tasks, the state of the task, etc. (cf., Arrow,
1985; Baiman, 1990). This can be termed performance-based asymmetry. Expertise- and
performance-based asymmetries afford the agent the ability to hide information and actions from
the principal.

Because of goal incongruence and information asymmetry, possibility always exists for the agent
to act opportunistically. Governance is necessary to control the agent’s behaviors that are not
explicitly stipulated in the employment contract (Baiman, 1990). Finance and accounting
researchers have long focused on governance of the management (as shareholders’ agent) via
compensation structure for the agent (e.g., Indjejikian, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Morgan
and Poulsen, 2001; Yermack, 2004). Management accounting literature primarily focuses on the
reduction of information asymmetry through monitoring (Baiman, 1990). Baiman (1982; 1990)
proposes the creation, through monitoring, an “information system” that the principal can utilize
to reduce the performance-based asymmetry and become more informed when evaluating and
controlling the task outcomes. This essay draws upon the IT governance literature for
mechanisms that reduce goal incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and
the principal.

2.5 IT Governance
As an integral part of the enterprise governance, IT governance is the organizational capacity to
ensure that IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy. IT Governance Institute (2003)
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defines it as the responsibility of the board of directors and executive management. De Haes and
Van Grembergen (2004) extend it and suggest that IT management also should be involved in
the process of governance.

Research on IT governance has long focused on a trichotomy of organizing logic for IT decision
making loci: centralization, decentralization, and federation, and on the antecedents that
determines the selection of a particular organizing logic over others (Brown and Grant, 2005;
Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000). Of more practical importance and research interest, however,
are the governance mechanisms “such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams,
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000, p. 106).” Thus, this essay
studies various types of governance mechanisms rather than the traditional patterns such as
centralization and decentralization. The categorization of the governance mechanisms is based
on the work by Peterson (2004), Van Grembergen and colleagues (De Haes and Van
Grembergen, 2004; Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops, 2004), and Weill and Ross
(2004).

Process-based governance mechanisms are IT management techniques that ensure that daily
behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in the effective
management and use of IT (Weill and Ross, 2004). It is the formal institution of strategic IT
decision making or IT monitoring procedures. With varying degrees of comprehensiveness, such
standard procedures often are embedded in formalized decision-making methodologies and
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management frameworks, e.g., IT investment approval process, balanced scorecard tools, costbenefit analysis, service level agreements, etc.

An important function provided by process-based mechanisms is the monitoring and tracking of
IT performance in terms of service delivery and business benefit realization (De Haes and Van
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004; Van Grembergen et al, 2004; Weill and Ross, 2004).
Examples include Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT), IT
Infrastructure Library (ITIL), and ISO17799.

A few process-based IT governance tools are available for organization to choose. For
compliance with SOX in terms of IT control, a de facto standard tool is the Control Objectives
for Information and related Technology (CobiT), created by IT Governance Institute (ITGI,
2000). CobiT is computing platform agnostic and highly process focused. It serves as a
framework for evaluating security and controls over information (Kairab, 2005). CobiT covers
all IT-related processes with strong control over InfoSec-related activities in an organization.
Out of the 54 control objectives in CobiT 3, 46 have detail control objectives (“sub-CO” of those
54 higher level COs) related to InfoSec and are baselined. Among other functionalities, CobiT
ensures that specific responsibilities for the management of security is properly defined; that IT
is properly staffed; that security are kept current and compliant with external regulations; that
IT’s compliance of internal SLAs is regularly examined; that proper security procedures are
being followed; and that the adequacy of security controls are regularly assessed (ITGI, 2004).
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Another framework that has substantial adoption is the IT Infrastructure Library (ITIL). ITIL is
also technology neutral and very focused on IT processes. One of ITIL’s underpinnings is
embedding InfoSec into everyday processes (Kairab, 2005). A more InfoSec-specific framework
is the ISO17799, the international standard for information security management. The ISO
17799 is a high-level standard for different InfoSec aspects, which are grouped into ten major
domains. It stresses InfoSec best practices and can serve as a benchmark for security
management (Kairab, 2005)

Structural governance mechanisms are the organizational units and roles that are instituted to
properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal connection between IT
and business functions, and ultimately, to achieve their IT governance goals (Peterson, 2004;
Peterson, O'Callaghan, and Ribbers, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).

Formal groups such as executive teams, committees, councils, task forces are an important
horizontal integration structures for coordinating IT decision making across business and IT.
They may be formed temporarily on a task or can be instituted permanently as an overlay
structure in the organization (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).

For instance, senior executive committees play a governance role in 90 percent of the
organizations surveyed by Weill and Ross (2004). When shared data and IT infrastructure is
desired, organizations often form various types of committees whose membership typically
includes the CEO, CFO, CIO, and heads of major business units. The decision makers’
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combined expertise provides a holistic view that is beneficial to the governance goal – shared
data and infrastructure. For matters whose decision right typically falls upon IT, such as IT
architecture, organizations with an IT leadership team or committee made up by corporate and
business-unit IT leaders perform better than those without. Linkages between business and IT
can also be fostered with mechanisms such as joint decision councils (Weill and Ross, 2004).

These structural mechanisms vary in their design and the degree to which they act as an advisory
function or exercise formal decision-making authority (Peterson, 2004; Weill and Ross, 2004).

Relational governance mechanisms are the organizational practices that encourage voluntary
two-way communication and collaboration between business and IT (De Haes and Van
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004; Van Grembergen et al, 2004).

The major desired outcomes of such mechanisms are better mutual understanding and effective
communication channels among the various stakeholders in the organization, such as corporate
management, business unit management, IT management, among others (Peterson, 2004). When
business and IT understand each other’s perspectives, they can accurately interpret and anticipate
others’ actions and coordinate adaptively. Better understanding and collaboration lead to an
integration of domain-specific expertise and tacit knowledge among people with different mental
models, insights, and perspectives (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al, 2000).
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Mechanisms that facilitate the mutual understanding and better communication among various
stakeholders include direct (informal) contacts, lobbying, joint performance incentives and
rewards, collocation of business and IT managers, cross-functional training, job rotations,
continuous education, etc.

2.6 Governance Mechanisms and Agency Problem Reduction
IT governance holds the potential to improve InfoSec outcomes by tackling the two root causes
of agency problems. Reduction of the two root causes, in turn, leads to more effective InfoSec
services.

Figure 2.1 Theoretical Model
In this section, the three types of governance mechanisms are discussed with regard to two
important activities that are critical to reducing goal incongruence and information asymmetry
between IT and users. The first activity is the definition of security requirements, which can be
enhanced by service level agreements. Clear definition of security requirements reduces the
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incongruence in goals. The second activity is security audit, which generates assessment and
feedback information on the effectiveness of information security implementation. In addition,
mutually-agreed security requirements also provide a common language of communication,
which aids the interpretation of results from security audits.

2.6.1 Goal Congruence
Goal congruence has been defined as the extent to which the relative importance of key
performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992; Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001), including
the achievability of goals (Jap, 1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003), are understood between/among
parties. For information security services, agreement on key performance criteria can be
achieved through a well-implemented process of defining security requirements. In addition, the
most important criteria may be solidified in the form of service level agreements.

Security requirements can be categorized into a three-tier structure (Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker,
2006): business, functional, and technical requirements. The business (or user) requirements are
high-level statements that capture the essence of what InfoSec will achieve for the business
(Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker, 2006). Functional requirements are the characteristics that
describe how an InfoSec solution or a system, when properly protected, meets the business
requirements (Gentile et al, 2006; Snedaker, 2006). Business and functional requirements, once
determined, become the basis for technical requirements. Technical requirements are statements
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of parameters or measurements that specify the InfoSec measures to be implemented (Snedaker,
2006).

Input from user departments is important to the processes of defining business and functional
requirements. Since they are the users of information assets, they have the best understanding of
what needs to be protected and to what extent (ITSMF, 2005). The process of soliciting business
requirements thus often starts with user identifying the relevant information assets to protect
(Alberts and Dorofee, 2003). Asset/data classification is commonly used as the basis for
determining the security requirements for information assets. Proper users are assigned the
stewardship of the asset and specify their security requirements (Wylder, 2004).

After the business and functional requirements are defined, IT uses them as the basis and specify
the technical requirements for information security. After the technical requirements are defined,
they serve as the yardstick by which IT evaluates the firm’s existing security baseline and
decides what additional security measures need to be implemented (Alberts and Dorofee, 2003;
ITSMF, 2005).

To ensure proper protection, technical requirements should support the functional requirements,
which, in turn, should serve the business requirements properly (Snedaker, 2006). In other
words, the technical measures and operations IT implements should meet users’ specifications of
desired results (functional requirements) and ultimately support users’ business needs (business
requirements). Therefore, for IT to provide quality InfoSec services to the users, it is essential
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that IT and users obtain mutual understanding on what services IT should provide and what
criteria to use for gauging IT’s effectiveness in providing the services. Such understanding, in
addition, may be formalized and articulated in service level agreements (SLAs).

A service level agreement “is an agreement between the provider of a service and its customers
which quantifies the minimum quality of service which meets the business need (Hiles, 1994, p.
14).” Besides the regular items to be seen in an agreement, e.g., parties to the agreement,
administration, revision, etc., it defines: (a) what the service is, (b) specifics of the service such
as timeframe and location within which it is rendered, (c) users’ expected level of service, (d)
performance indicators, (e) constraints that delineate service attainability beyond which service
levels are not guaranteed, and (f) reporting procedure and remedies for nonperformance (Larson,
1998; Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003; Singleton, McLean, and Altman, 1988; Sturm, Morris,
and Jander, 2000). A key benefit of SLAs is that they clarify precisely what the customers’
needs are and which elements are the most important (Hiles, 1994). Thus they establish a
common language of communications for the parties involved and set mutually-agreed standards
for measuring performance (Sturm et al, 2000). These commonalities are even more important
for the evaluation of qualitative aspects of IT (Singleton et al, 1988).

In short, collaboration and communications between IT and user departments during the
definition process of security requirements is essential to enhancing goal congruence between the
two. SLAs, if implemented, also promote goal congruence because they clearly define expected
achievable service levels, goal attainability, and performance criteria.
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2.6.1.1 Process-based mechanisms and goal congruence
Process-based IT governance frameworks, techniques, and methodologies abound for firms to
align the process of InfoSec planning with its business objectives, including capturing user
security requirements correctly. For instance, in CobiT 3’s Plan and Organize (PO) domain,
Control Objectives PO1 governs the processes of identifying critical information and services
and considering security requirements. PO6 promotes consistent communication and regular
discussion of the basic rules for implementing security requirements and responding to security
incidents. Quality management issues are covered in PO11. Control objective DS1 in the
Deliver and Support (DS) domain governs the various aspects of both in-house and external
SLAs (ITGI, 2004; Lahti and Peterson, 2005). In ITIL, SLAs are addressed as the first book on
the subject of Service Delivery. Security Management is one of the major subjects in the ITIL
library. The Control process in Security Management stresses the importance of operational
level agreement via the use of SLAs (ITSMF, 2005).

Both CobiT and ITIL have a strong InfoSec focus. Firms can also implement InfoSec-specific
frameworks such as ISO17799 for InfoSec management or the OCTAVE method for security
requirement determination. Regardless of the specific mechanism(s) used and the degree of
formality of SLAs, the key is that the mechanisms engender the process of establishing security
requirements and service expectations between IT and users.
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During this process, IT has the opportunity to discuss with users the technical feasibility or
difficulty of fulfilling their security requirements, given the current state of security technologies
and the firm’s resources. The process also explicates both parties’ outlook and stance on risks.
When an agreement is achieved, conflicts in expectations and risk stance should have been
resolved or at least documented in a proviso. The resultant expectations for security services
thus are something IT will buy into. Therefore,
H1a: Process-based governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

2.6.1.2 Structural mechanisms and goal congruence
In addition to the process-based mechanisms, various structural mechanisms also allow IT and
business objectives and priorities to be discussed openly and formally. Formal groups such as
executive teams, committees, councils, and task forces are important structures for coordinating
IT decision making across business and IT. They may be formed temporarily on a task or
instituted permanently as an overlay structure in the organization (Peterson, 2004; Peterson et al,
2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).

Structural mechanisms such as IT steering committee, IT budget committee, IT strategy
committee and similar organizational councils and committees are the venue in which IT and
user departments present their cases and view points regarding information security. Competing
ideas and projects are debated and consensus is built. In addition, formal liaison roles expedite
communication between IT and users. As the result, IT achieves a better understanding of users’
37

requirements for InfoSec and is better prepared to devise security plans in accordance with such
goals and priorities. Therefore,
H2a: Structural governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

2.6.1.3 Relational mechanisms and goal congruence
People inside a firm interact with each other daily and spontaneous cooperative relationships
develop as a by-product of seemingly random, uncontrollable actions. Such voluntary
relationships help people build network of contracts and communication channels that they can
use for job performance. With proper organizational practices, firms can consciously reduce the
randomness and increase the chances that these voluntary contacts occur in pursuit of the firm’s
goals (Galbraith, 1993). They can implement relational mechanisms by encouraging or
instituting practices that foster the relationship between IT and user departments. These
mechanisms are characterized by their participative and shared nature (Nilakant and Rao, 1994;
Peterson, 2004). Examples include direct (informal) contacts, lobbying, joint performance
incentives and rewards, collocation of user departments and IT, cross-functional training, job
rotations, etc. Firms may also implement initiatives such as strategic dialogs (Nordblom, 2006)
or relationship management (Martin, Hatzakis, Lycett, and Macredie, 2004). Or they can be as
simple as daily procedures and actions such as keeping each other updated of new developments
in the department.
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An amiable relationship between IT and business promotes better communications and
understanding between the two. In addition to positive effects on IT morale and motivation,
these mechanisms also furnish IT with information about with whom to communicate and when
communication with business departments is necessary. These, in turn, encourage IT to be more
interested in and sensitive to users’ security requirements. They are also conducive to the
creation of SLAs. IT thus will have a better grasp of the users’ goals in terms of InfoSec
protection and be more motivated to exercise efforts in delivering good service to user
departments. Therefore,
H3a: Relational governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

2.6.2 Information Asymmetry
An important way to reduce information asymmetry between the agent and the principal is
monitoring (Adams, 1994; Baiman, 1990). Monitoring of InfoSec effectiveness usually is
performed through security assessments and IT audits.

A security assessment is the process of determining whether the existing information security
program is adequately addressing the firm’s security risks and is promptly updated for changes in
business (Kairab, 2005; Snedaker, 2006).

The scope of assessments can range from focused to comprehensive, depending on the situation.
An example of the former is a vulnerability assessment. Also termed “vulnerability scan,” it
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identifies known vulnerabilities in the firm’s operating systems and system-level software.
Analysis of vulnerability assessment results points to possible weakness in the IT infrastructure.
The vulnerability assessment can be taken one step further by performing a penetration test, or
“pen test” for short. A pen test exploits the know vulnerabilities uncovered through the
vulnerability scan and tries to penetrate systems and gain access to critical system files, functions,
and information. If such an attempt fails, the security measures in place are validated. Finally,
at the other end of the spectrum of testing scope, a comprehensive assessment can take the form
of a risk assessment that considers more than just technical vulnerabilities but also security
threats in the environment as well. Vulnerability scan and pen test often are performed as part of
the risk assessment. Results from risk assessments contain a wealth of information about the
security of the firm’s information and information systems (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002).

An audit typically is less technical than an assessment but broader in scope (Kairab, 2005).
Internal IT auditors usually start their audit with a system. They try to decide the sensitivity of
the information the system processes and the criticality of the system to the business operations.
They then evaluate the types and sufficiency of security measures that are in place. External
audits are more comprehensive and often have the additional objective of validating policy or
legal compliance (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002). Audits may spot weak areas that prompt the
firm to conduct a more technical security assessment.

The difference between security assessments and audits is actually quite subtle (Kairab, 2005).
For conciseness, the term “security audit” is used to refer to these monitoring methods
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collectively. Security audits can be performed by either internal auditors or a third party.
Although self-assessments can be performed by IT itself, for unbiased opinions assessments also
should be performed by external auditors and/or pen testers (Maiwald and Sieglein, 2002).
When executed properly, security audits enable the firm to obtain an independent view of
security. They uncover security risks and potentially raise issues about employee performance
(Kairab, 2005). Therefore, security audit is a very effective way to provide information on the
outcomes of a firm’s security organization’s work. As the result, the information asymmetry
between IT and users is reduced.

2.6.2.1 Process-based mechanisms and information asymmetry
The benefits of implementing process-based mechanisms include the formalization of IT-related
processes, standard language of communication, and metrics of IT performance. All these
facilitate the conducting of security audits.

For example, CobiT groups IT processes into four “domains” covering the entire life cycle of IT
process – Plan and Organize, Acquire and Implement, Deliver and Support, and Monitor and
Evaluate. Each domain contains a number of “control objectives” that govern IT processes
belonging in that domain. Each control objective, in turn, is divided into a number of activities
that are termed “detailed control objectives.” CobiT distills a set of common, high-level
information criteria. The goals for each control objective are specified with regard to which of
those criteria the control objective should fulfill, and to what extent. It is notable that out of the
41

seven criteria three are for information security, i.e., the CIA triad. To measure each process’
performance, ITGI also devises a system of metrics that include maturity models, critical success
factors (CSFs), key goal indicators (KGIs), and key performance indicators (KPIs). Maturity
models allow the organization to benchmark each of its IT process against the industry, the
international standards, or the organization’s strategic goal for that process. The CSFs are the
most important issues or actions that must be addressed successfully to be compliant with that
control objective. KGIs measure whether an IT process has achieved its business requirements.
While KGIs measure the “what” of goal achievement, KPIs measure the “how” side – how well
the process is utilizing resources toward the achievement of the goals (ITGI, 2004; Lahti and
Peterson, 2005).

Similarly, ITIL groups IT processes into a number of areas. The guidance for improving the
service quality of each is laid out in its corresponding publication. ITIL’s governance
framework is established by the collection, or “library,” of these publications (hence the “L” in
ITIL). These IT areas include: Business Perspectives, Service Management, Service Delivery,
Service Support, ICT Infrastructure Management, Security Management, etc. Within each, a
number of subjects are addressed in more details. The publications specify the objectives,
activities, inputs, and outputs for processes categorized in each of these subjects (ITSMF, 2005).
ISO17799, the international standard for information security best practices, groups InfoSec
activities into ten domains, each containing a number of control objectives (Peltier, 2002).
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What these frameworks try to capture, organize, and govern are really the same set of IT
processes and services. The differences between them are more a matter of organizing logic. In
fact, ITGI’s Security Baseline contains mappings between CobiT and ISO17799 control
objectives. More extensive mappings between Cobit, ISO17799, and ITIL are provided in
Aligning CobiT, ITIL, and ISO17799 for Business Benefits.

In summary, these process-based frameworks organize IT processes into a manageable number
of control objectives. This lends well to the checklist methodology that audits usually adopt.
For instance, based on the CobiT system of organizing IT processes and metrics, ITGI also
creates an Audit Guidelines for IT audits. They enable the auditors to review specific IT
processes that are most relevant to the audit purpose at hand. In addition, these frameworks also
create a common terminology inside the firm that makes interpretation and comparison of audit
results much easier. Therefore,
H1b: Process governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and users.

2.6.2.2 Structural mechanisms and information asymmetry
Of particular importance are the structural mechanisms regarding security audits. Proper
implementation of structural mechanisms establishes an independent feedback channel and gives
assurance to users regarding the quality of monitoring information (Jordan and Silcock, 2005).
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Proper governance ensures that audit responsibilities are entrusted with the proper organizational
unit that is impartial to the audit results. An important mission of the audit committee is to
ensure the independence of the audit function, which, ideally, should report directly to the audit
committee. Independence of the audit function allows auditors to be free from undue influence,
monitor fairly, and serve the organization’s overall goals by focusing on the risks most critical to
the business (Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003; Schweitzer, 1987; Straub, 1988).

Also, a proper audit committee has representatives from every major group in the firm. This
helps to achieve adequate coverage of information security issues related to each of the groups
(Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003).

Therefore, structural governance mechanisms ensure proper composition and positioning of the
audit function and audit committee. As the result, the monitoring information gathered is most
likely to be complete, impartial, and suitable to the firm’s business needs. With this faithful
audit information, users will be better informed of IT’s actions and the state of the organization’s
information security. Therefore,
H2b: Structural governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and
users.

2.6.2.3 Relational mechanisms and information asymmetry
Relational mechanisms enhance communication and understanding between IT and users.
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With better understanding of IT staffers’ qualifications, work environment, the profession they
are in, their risk stance, and their basic approach to problem solving qualifications, users are
more informed when they interpret and evaluate security audit results.

Both agency theory and signaling theory (Morris, 1987) suggest that the agent may be motivated
to offer information to the principal to assure the latter of desirable results from the task. Such
information is beneficial to the principal even if there might be some “noise” created by the
agent’s intentional shaping of the communication of that information (Levinthal, 1988). A
pleasant relationship motivates IT to have more interactions with business and be more willing to
furnish users with information regarding IT’s qualifications for, approaches to, and actions in
providing InfoSec services.

For example, if IT staffers voluntarily seek and obtain industry certifications on information
security, it provides users information on the staff’s capabilities that would otherwise be difficult
to assess. If IT initiates frequently communication regarding the firm’s current information
security status, new information security threats likely to affect the organization, new trends in
InfoSec defense measures, etc., users will feel not as uninformed when it comes to evaluate the
IT’s performance. The result of IT providing information like this is that users arrive in a
position that is better able to evaluate IT’s technology provisioning, recommendations for
information security services, and results from security audits. Therefore,
H3b: Relational governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and
users.
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2.6.3 Governance and Effectiveness of InfoSec Services
As discussed earlier, the effectiveness of InfoSec services include three aspects – quality service,
asset protection, and business function support. Addressing the root causes for agency problems
enhances effectiveness in these aspects.

Better understanding of “client” goals allows IT to better deliver the information, products, and
services the client desires (Peak and Guynes, 2003). Governance mechanisms improve the goal
congruence between IT and the internal customers. Part of the improvement comes from the
rapport built between IT and business departments because one type of the governance
mechanisms focuses on relationship building. When IT understands users’ requirements with
positive emotional predisposition, it is more willing to treat the users with better service and
strives to seek out technical solutions, plan resources, and implement proper protection measures
so that assets are better protected. IT is also more willing to provide support the users on their
job by providing InfoSec related services to help them fulfill operational, regulatory, and legal
requirements so that they can perform better on their jobs. Therefore,
H4: Enhanced goal congruence between IT and users are positively related to higher
effectiveness in InfoSec services provided by IT.

On the other hand, reduction in information asymmetry makes the users much better “shopper”
for services. Suboptimal service quality is more likely to result in “customer complaints” which
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can lead to corrective actions taken upon IT. In extreme cases, it may lead to the outsourcing of
the InfoSec function thus threatening IT’s job security. Hence, IT will be more sensitive toward
its service quality.

Proper monitoring activities such as security assessments help to spot security vulnerabilities and
loopholes and alert the firm in a timely manner. Users thus are more informed of IT’s
performance and security measures’ effectiveness in protecting information assets. Remedy of
the problems is more likely to take place promptly and results in better protection of assets. Also,
when evaluating users’ job performance, the information generated from monitoring helps to
identify the impact caused by inadequate InfoSec services provided by IT. This strengthens
accountability and encourages IT to do their part to avoid the embarrassment of being traced
down as the obstacle to users’ job performance. Therefore,
H5: Reduced information asymmetry between IT and users are positively related to higher
effectiveness in InfoSec services provided by IT.

2.7 Conclusion
Organizations are implementing IT governance initiatives and investing heavily in information
security. Due to the nature of information security, in most organizations information security is
implemented and managed primarily by the internal IT department. In essence, IT acts as an
agent for internal “customers” – the various business departments. To ensure that IT provides
the desired outcomes, i.e., best protection of information assets and quality services to business
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departments, proper governance of the information security function is needed. Information
security governance is an integrated part of IT governance and can be implemented with a
variety of IT governance mechanisms. This essay delves into the rich array of governance
mechanisms and presents them as a trio of process-based, structural, and relational mechanisms.
It explains the efficacy of these mechanisms in guiding information security function toward
more effective InfoSec services by adopting an agency theory perspective. More specifically, it
suggests that suboptimal outcomes occur when the agent does not act in the best interest of the
principal, i.e., when agency problems occur. The two root causes for agency problems are goal
incongruence and information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. IT governance
mechanisms help to reduce agency problems by addressing these two root causes. In the context
of information security, they work by facilitating better understanding of user requirements for
information security and providing information feedback through objective assessment of the
state of security in the organization. These reduce the goal congruence and information
asymmetry and lead to higher effectiveness in InfoSec services.

48

2.8 Chapter 2 List of Reference
1.

Adams, M. B. (1994). Agency theory and the internal audit. Managerial Auditing Journal,
9(8), 8-12.

2.

Alberts, C., & Dorofee, A. (2003). Managing Information Security Risks: The OCTAVE
Approach. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

3.

Arrow, K. J. (1985). The economics of agency. In J. W. Pratt & R. J. Zeckhauser (Eds.),
Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (pp. 37-51). Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press.

4.

Avižienis, A., Laprie, J.-C., Randell, B., & Landwehr, C. (2004). Basic concepts and
taxonomy of dependable and secure computing. IEEE Transactions on Dependable and
Secure Computing, 1(1), 11-33.

5.

Baiman, S. (1982). Agency research in managerial accounting: A survey. Journal of
Accounting Literature, 1, 154-213.

6.

Baiman, S. (1990). Agency research in managerial accounting: A second look. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 15(4), 341-371.

7.

Brown, A. E., & Grant, G. G. (2005). Framing the frameworks: A review of IT governance
research. Communications of the AIS, 15, 696-712.

8.

BSA, & ISSA. (2004). BSA-ISSA Information Security Study Online Survey of ISSA
Members: Business Software Alliance and Information Systems Security Association.

9.

Clark, T. (1993). The market provision of management services, information asymmetries
and service quality - Some market solutions: An empirical example. British Journal of
Management, 4, 235-251.

10.

De Haes, S., & Van Grembergen, W. (2004). IT governance and its mechanisms.
Information Systems Control Journal, 2004, 1-7.

11.

Dhillon, G., & Backhouse, J. (2001). Current directions in IS security research: Towards
socio-organizational perspectives. Information Systems Journal, 11, 127-153.

12.

Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74.

13.

Galbraith, J. R. (1993). Competing with Flexible Lateral Organizations (2nd ed.). Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley.
49

14.

Gentile, M., Collette, R., & August, T. (2006). The CISO Handbook, A Practical Guide to
Securing Your Company. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications.

15.

Gollmann, D. (2006). Computer Security (2nd ed.). West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

16.

Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2005). 2005 CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey. San Francisco, CA: Computer Security Institute.

17.

Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2006). 2006 CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey. San Francisco, CA: Computer Security Institute.

18.

Grance, T., Hash, J., Stevens, M., O'Neal, K., & Bartol, N. (2003). NIST Special
Publication 800-35: Guide to Information Technology Security Services. Washington, D.C.:
National Institute of Standards and Technology.

19.

Hiles, A. N. (1994). Service level agreements: Panacea or pain? The TQM Magazine, 6(2),
14-16.

20.

Indjejikian, R. J. (1999). Performance evaluation and compensation research: An agency
perspective. Accounting Horizons, 13(2), 147-157.

21.

ITGI. (2000). CobiT 3rd Edition Executive Summary. Rolling Meadows, IL: IT
Governance Institute.

22.

ITGI. (2003). Board Briefing on IT Governance (2nd ed.). Rolling Meadows, IL: ITGI.

23.

ITGI. (2004). CobiT Security Baseline. Rolling Meadows, IL: IT Governance Institute.

24.

ITGI. (2006). Information Security Governance: Guidance for Boards of Directors and
Executive Management (2nd ed.). Rolling Meadows, IL: IT Governance Institute.

25.

ITSMF. (2005). Foundations of IT Service Management Based on ITIL. Hogeweg, The
Netherlands: Van Haren Publishing.

26.

Jap, S. D. (1999). Pie-expansion efforts: Collaboration processes in buyer-supplier
relationships. Journal of Marketing Research, 36(4), 461-475.

27.

Jap, S. D., & Anderson, E. (2003). Safeguarding interorganizational performance and
continuity under ex post opportunism. Management Science, 49(12), 1684-1701.

28.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior,
agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.

29.

Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives.
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-284.
50

30.

Jordan, E., & Silcock, L. (2005). Beating IT Risks. West Sussex, UK: John Wiley & Sons.

31.

Kairab, S. (2005). A Practical Guide to Security Assessments. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach
Publications.

32.

Lahti, C. B., & Peterson, R. (2005). Sarbanes-Oxley IT Compliance Using CobiT and Open
Source Tools. Rockland, MA: Syngress Publishing, Inc.

33.

Larson, K. D. (1998). The role of service level agreements in IT service delivery.
Information Management & Computer Security, 6(3), 128-132.

34.

Levinthal, D. (1988). A survey of agency models of organizations. Journal of Economic
Behavior and Organization, 9, 153-185.

35.

Maiwald, E., & Sieglein, W. (2002). Security Planning and Disaster Recovery. Berkeley,
CA: McGraw-Hill/Osborne.

36.

Martin, V. A., Hatzakis, T., Lycett, M., & Macredie, R. (2004). Building the business/IT
relationship through knowledge management. Journal of Information Technology Cases
and Applications, 6(2), 27-47.

37. McKenna, B. (2002). Managed security services - New economy relic or wave of the future.
Computers & Security, 21(7), 613-616.
38.

Mills, P. K. (1990). On the quality of services in encounters: An agency perspective.
Journal of Business Research, 20, 31-41.

39.

Morgan, A. G., & Poulsen, A. B. (2001). Linking pay to performance - Compensation
proposals in the S&P 500. Journal of Financial Economics, 62, 489-523.

40.

Morris, R. D. (1987). Signalling, agency theory and accounting policy choice. Accounting
and Business Research, 18(69), 47-56.

41.

Neely, A., & Wilson, J. (1992). Measuring product goal congruence: An exploratory case
study. International Journal of Operations & Production Management, 12(4), 45-52.

42.

Nilakant, V., & Rao, H. (1994). Agency theory and uncertainty in organizations: An
evaluation. Organization Studies, 15(5), 649-672.

43.

Nordblom, C. (2006). Involving middle managers in strategy at Volvo Group. Strategic
Communication Management, 10(2), 26-29.

44.

Peak, D., & Guynes, C. S. (2003). Improving information quality through IT alignment
planning: A case study. Information Systems Management, 20(4), 22-29.
51

45.

Peltier, T. R. (2002). Information Security: Policies, Procedures, and Standards. Boca
Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications.

46.

Peterson, R. R. (2004). Crafting information technology governance. Information Systems
Management, 21(4), 7-22.

47.

Peterson, R. R., O'Callaghan, R., & Ribbers, P. M. A. (2000). Information technology
governance by design. Proceedings of the Twenty-first International Conference on
Information Systems, Brisbane, Australia, December 10-13, 2000. 435-452.

48.

Pitt, L. F., Watson, R. T., & Kavan, C. B. (1995). Service quality: A measure of
information systems effectiveness. MIS Quarterly, 19(2), 173-187.

49.

Pontes, M. C. (1995). Agency theory: A framework for analyzing physician services.
Health Care Management Review, 20(4), 57-67.

50.

Posthumus, S., & von Solms, R. (2004). A framework for the governance of information
security. Computers & Security, 23, 638-646.

51.

Rittinghouse, J. W., & Hancock, W. M. (2003). Cybersecurity Operations Handbook.
Burlington, MA: Digital Press.

52.

Sambamurthy, V., & Zmud, R. W. (2000). The organizing logic for an enterprise's IT
activities in the digital era - A prognosis of practice and a call for research. Information
Systems Research, 11(2), 105-114.

53.

Schweitzer, J. A. (1987). Computers, Business, and Security: The New Role for Security.
Stoneham, MA: Butterworth Publishers.

54.

Singh, J., & Sirdeshmukh, D. (2000). Agency and trust mechanisms in consumer
satisfaction and loyalty judgments. Academy of Marketing Science Journal, 28(1), 150-167.

55.

Singleton, J. P., McLean, E. R., & Altman, E. N. (1988). Measuring information systems
performance: Experience with the management by results system at Security Pacific Bank.
MIS Quarterly, 12(2), 325-337.

56. Snedaker, S. (2006). IT Security Project Management Handbook. Rockland, MA: Syngress.
57.

Straub, D. W. (1988). Organizational structuring of the computer security function.
Computers & Security, 7(2), 185-195.

58.

Sturm, R., Morris, W., & Jander, M. (2000). Foundations of Service Level Management.
Indianapolis, IN: Sams.

52

59.

Symantec. (2004). Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Regulatory Perspective. Cupertino, CA:
Symantec Corporation.

60.

Van Grembergen, W., De Haes, S., & Guldentops, E. (2004). Structure, process and
relational mechanism for IT governance. In W. V. Grembergen (Ed.), Strategies for
Information Technology Governance (pp. 1-36). Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing.

61.

Volonino, L., Gessner, G. H., & Kermis, G. F. (2004). Sarbanes-Oxley links IT to
corporation compliance. Proceedings of the Tenth Americas Conference on Information
Systems, New York, NY. 4600-4607.

62.

Von Solms, B. (2005). Information security governance - Compliance management vs
operational management. Computers & Security, 21(4), 356-371.

63.

Von Solms, S. H. (2005). Information security governance - Compliance management vs
operational management. Computers & Security, 24, 443-447.

64.

Warkentin, M., & Johnston, A. C. (2006a). IT Governance and Organizational Design for
Security Management. In D. Straub, S. Goodman & R. Baskerville (Eds.), Information
Security Policies and Practices. Armonk, NY USA: M.E. Sharpe.

65.

Warkentin, M., & Johnston, A. C. (2006b). IT security governance and centralized security
controls. In M. Warkentin & R. Vaughn (Eds.), Enterprise Information Systems Assurance
and System Security. Hershey, PA: Idea Group Publishing.

66.

Weill, P., & Ross, J. W. (2004). IT Governance: How Top Performers Manage IT Decision
Rights for Superior Results. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

67.

Whitman, M. E., & Mattord, H. J. (2005). Principles of Information Security. Boston, MA:
Thomson Course Technology.

68.

Wickramasinghe, N., & Ginzberg, M. J. (2001). Integrating knowledge workers and the
organization: The role of IT. International Journal of Health Care Quality Assurance,
14(6), 245-253.

69.

Williams, P. (2007). Executive and board roles in information security. Network Security,
2007, 11-14.

70.

Wylder, J. (2004). Strategic Information Security. Boca Raton, FL: Auerbach Publications.

71.

Yermack, D. (2004). Remuneration, retention, adn reputation incentives for outside
directors. Journal of Finance, 59(5), 2281-2308.

53

54

CHAPTER 3 EFFECTS OF IT GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS ON
INFORMATION SECURITY SERVICE EFFECTIVENESS: AN
EMPIRICAL TEST

3.1 Introduction
To protect business information, executives and business users rely on a number of information
security (InfoSec) services (Grance, Hash, Stevens, O'Neal, and Bartol, 2003). If the IT
department cannot provide effective InfoSec services, the results can be costly. Recently, there
are calls for better governance of the information security function to ensure that it serves the
company’s business needs (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004). The board of directors and
executive management, therefore, should take the lead in the implementation of a proper
governance framework (Posthumus and von Solms, 2004; Williams, 2007).

Information security governance is an integral part of IT governance (ITGI, 2006; Posthumus
and von Solms, 2004; Von Solms, 2005). As such, it usually is implemented by taking
advantage of broader, enterprise-wide IT governance mechanisms. For instance, some
governance function of InfoSec can be implemented as part of the implementation of Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT) or Information Technology
Infrastructure Library (ITIL). In addition to these mechanisms that are IT process oriented, a
variety of other governance mechanisms are available, with a focus on organizational structure or
relationships. These governance mechanisms, however, have not been sufficiently addressed in
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academic research, which largely stresses the traditional centralized-decentralized-federal
trichotomy of governance forms (e.g.,Warkentin and Johnston, 2006a, 2006b). Thus, this study
addresses these research questions:
1. Does implementation of various IT governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of
information security services?
2. Which type(s) of mechanisms are more critical for improving information security?

To understand these questions, we use agency theory to explain their efficacy in governing
information security to explain the effectiveness of three types of governance mechanisms. IT is
viewed as an agent providing InfoSec services to the business departments, who are the
principals. The governance mechanisms are hypothesized to reduce goal incongruence and
information asymmetry between the agent and the principal. They, in turn, improve the
effectiveness of InfoSec services.

The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. First, the role of IT as a provider of information
security services is discussed. This is followed by a discussion of agency relationship and
agency problems in the context of information security function. Next, IT governance and three
types of governance mechanisms are introduced. We then present hypotheses on the
relationships among (a) the governance mechanisms, (b) two root causes of agency problems, i.e.,
goal congruence and information asymmetry, and the (c) the effectiveness of InfoSec services.
Next, we describe a survey of security managers and business managers for empirical testing of
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those hypotheses. Research findings are presented, followed by a discussion of those findings
and the theoretical contribution. Implications for future research also are discussed.

3.2 Information Security Services
IT is a staff function that provides services to internal “customers” – other departments
throughout the organization (Pitt, Watson, and Kavan, 1995). This is particularly true when it
comes to information security. The outcomes of InfoSec activities fit the characteristics of
services as described by Clark (1993) – (a) intangibility: The outcomes of information security
are usually intangible; (b) inseparability: InfoSec services are “sold” and “consumed” at the
same time; (c) heterogeneity: each instance of InfoSec service is unique due to the differences in
the user’s specific computer environment, the context of a security problem, and the IT staffer’s
individuality; (d) perishability: InfoSec services cannot be stored; and (e) non-transferability:
there is no transfer of ownership when InfoSec services are rendered.

InfoSec services provided by IT address InfoSec at three levels – (a) management: developing
and maintaining an organization-wide security program, formulating security policies, designing
the security architecture, etc.; (b) operations: handling important InfoSec operations such as
contingency planning, incident response, security testing, user training, etc.; and (c) Technical:
technical implementation of InfoSec mechanisms, such as firewall configuration and
management, intrusion detection system design and monitoring, public key infrastructure (PKI)
implementation, etc. (Grance et al, 2003)
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In theory, these services can be offered by internal IT or external vendors (Grance et al, 2003).
In practice, however, industry surveys continuously show that only a very small percentage of
firms actually outsource their information security services and, even then, usually only to a
limited extent (BSA and ISSA, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, and Richardson, 2005, 2006;
McKenna, 2002). The information security function normally sits within an internal InfoSec
function or IT department.

Whether IT provides effective InfoSec should be evaluated in three areas – business function,
customers, and effective security. Any metrics of effectiveness should include efficacy of
implementation, service delivery, and business impact (Grance et al, 2003).

The efficacy of implementation is reflected in how services protects the safety of information
assets. Second, an important measurement of the effectiveness of IT is the quality of service it
provides (Pitt et al, 1995). IT should deliver reliable services, be responsive to user service
requests, be considerate with user requirements, perform services in a professional manner, etc.
Third, the security assurance provided by IT should support business users in their job functions.

3.3 Agency Relationship in Information Security
As the provider of security services to the internal “customers,” IT in essence acts as an agent for
the principal, i.e., the business departments. Agency relationships exist because the principal
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delegates the task because of lack of time or ability to do the task (Nilakant and Rao, 1994),
among other reasons. Similarly, although business departments are the owner of information
assets in the company, they need to delegate the provision of InfoSec services to IT because IT
usually is the only organizational unit that has the expertise and skills for it.

The downside to agency relationship is the loss of principal welfare, which is commonly referred
to as two agency problems – (a) adverse selection refers to the agent’s exerting inappropriate
types of effort (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). For example, a security administrator may dismiss
abnormal activities on corporate network as transient peaks in traffic while the reality is that an
attacker is scanning the network; and (b) moral hazard means that the agent exercises inadequate
effort (Mills, 1990). A security administrator may dislike the mundane task of reviewing logs
from firewalls, intrusion detection systems, Windows operating systems, etc. In such cases, she
thus only performs a cursory daily review of the log entries and sometimes skips the review
altogether.

Agency problems are the result of two fundamental causes – goal incongruence between the
agent and the principal and the principal’s difficulty in verifying the agent’s abilities and efforts
due to asymmetric information (Eisenhardt, 1989). The difficulty in verification is mostly the
result of information asymmetry. Since, in many cases, the agent has the expertise the principal
does not have and is directly involved in performing the task, the agent accumulates and
possesses a wealth of information to which the principal cannot gain easy access.
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Agency literature in fields such as accounting and finance has focused on governance as a way to
control agency problems. Often the goal is to use compensation structures to align managers’
(the agents’) interest with the principal’s (e.g., Indjejikian, 1999; Jensen and Murphy, 1990;
Morgan and Poulsen, 2001; Yermack, 2004) or to create, through monitoring, an “information
system” that the principal can utilize to reduce the performance-based asymmetry (Baiman, 1982,
1990). However insightful this literature in accounting and finance is, this study draws upon the
IT governance literature for mechanisms to reduce goal incongruence and information
asymmetry between the agent and the principal.

3.4 IT Governance Mechanisms
IT governance is an integral part of corporate governance. It is the organizational capacity to
ensure that IT sustains and extends the organization’s strategy (ITGI, 2003). The extant IS
literature on IT governance has long centered on decision making patterns that can be centralized,
decentralized, or federal. Of more practical importance and research interest, however, are the
governance mechanisms such as sourcing arrangements, strategic alliances, roles, teams,
processes, and informal relationships (Sambamurthy and Zmud, 2000). Although some
researchers have proposed three types of IT governance mechanisms (De Haes and Van
Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004a; Van Grembergen, De Haes, and Guldentops, 2004), much
of this has been carried out at the theoretical level. To the best of our knowledge, no empirical
research in InfoSec literature has concentrated on governance mechanisms. Therefore, we
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explore three categories of IT governance mechanisms in this study, one basing on process, one
on structure, and one on relations:

1. Process-based governance mechanisms are IT management techniques that ensure that
daily behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in
the effective management and use of IT (Weill and Ross, 2004). It is the formal
institution of strategic IT decision making or IT monitoring procedures. Examples
include CobiT, ITIL, and ISO17799.

2. Structural governance mechanisms are the organizational units and roles that are
instituted to properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal
connection between IT and business functions, and ultimately, to achieve IT governance
goals (Peterson, 2004a; Peterson, O'Callaghan, and Ribbers, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004).
Formal groups such as executive teams, committees, councils, task forces are an
important horizontal integration structures for coordinating IT decision making across
business and IT. These structures provide a holistic view that is beneficial to the
governance goals. Linkages between business and IT can also be fostered with
mechanisms such as joint decision councils (Weill and Ross, 2004).

3. Relational governance mechanisms are the organizational practices that encourage
voluntary two-way communication and collaboration between business and IT (De Haes
and Van Grembergen, 2004; Peterson, 2004a; Van Grembergen et al, 2004). The main
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desired outcomes of such mechanisms are better mutual understanding and effective
communication channels among the various stakeholders in the organization, such as
corporate management, business unit management, IT management, among others
(Peterson, 2004a). Relational governance mechanisms include direct (informal) contacts,
lobbying, joint performance incentives and rewards, collocation of business and IT
managers, cross-functional training, job rotations, continuous education, etc.

3.5 Governance Mechanisms and Agency Problem Reduction
IT governance holds the potential to improve InfoSec outcomes by tackling the two underlying
causes of agency problems. Reduction of the two root causes, in turn, leads to more effective
InfoSec services. Figure 1 presents our theoretical model.

Figure 3.1 Research Model
The three types of governance mechanisms improve the effectiveness of InfoSec services by
addressing the underlying causes – goal incongruence and information asymmetry. This study
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addresses these relationships through a critical aspect of providing InfoSec service – gathering
users’ requirements for security and assessing and monitoring of the fulfillment of those
requirements.

3.5.1 Goal congruence
Goal congruence has been defined as the extent to which the relative importance of key
performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992; Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001), including
the achievability of goals (Jap, 1999; Jap and Anderson, 2003), are understood between/among
parties. For InfoSec services, agreement on key performance criteria can be achieved through a
well-implemented process of defining security requirements. IT should understand users’ highlevel business requirements, those that capture the essence of what InfoSec will achieve for the
business, as well as functional requirements that describe how an InfoSec solution or a system,
when properly protected, meets the business requirements. Based on understanding of these
requirements, IT can then derive specific technical requirements and implement the proper
security mechanisms accordingly (Gentile, Collette, and August, 2006; Snedaker, 2006).

In the process of requirement determination, collaboration and communications between IT and
user departments is essential to enhancing goal congruence between the two. Governance
mechanisms promote such collaboration and communications.
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When implementing process-based governance mechanisms, companies have to explicate their
IT processes and organize them logically. This can be seen in the CobiT model where IT
processes are grouped into four broad areas and further subdivided into control objectives and
detailed control objectives. ISO17799 has a similar hierarchy that focuses exclusively on
security-related processes.

A benefit of implementing process-based mechanisms is that in the implementation process the
company encourages IT and business departments to dialogue about IT processes and assets. As
the result IT gains a better understanding of what assets to protect in addition to the business and
IT contexts for such protection. IT can discuss with users the technical feasibility or difficulty of
fulfilling their security requirements, given the current state of security technologies and the
firm’s resources. Therefore,
H1a: Process-based governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

In addition to the process-based mechanisms, various structural mechanisms also allow IT and
business objectives and priorities to be discussed openly and formally (Peterson, 2004a; Peterson
et al, 2000; Weill and Ross, 2004). Structural mechanisms such as IT steering committees, IT
budget committees, and IT strategy committees and similar organizational councils and
committees are the venue through which IT and user departments present their cases and
viewpoints regarding information security. Competing ideas and projects are debated and
consensus is built. As the result, IT achieves a better understanding of user requirements for
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InfoSec and is better prepared to devise security plans in accordance with such goals and
priorities. Therefore,
H2a: Structural governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

Relational governance mechanisms try to consciously catalyze the voluntary relationship
building process employees experience every day. Such voluntary relationships, in fact, are an
important way by which employees build network of contracts and communication channels that
they can use for job performance. Relational governance mechanisms reduce the randomness
and increase the chances that these voluntary contacts occur in pursuit of the firm’s goals
(Galbraith, 1993). As the result, a good relationship between IT and business promotes better
communications and understanding between the two and encourage IT to be more interested in
and sensitive to user security requirements. Therefore,
H3a: Relational governance mechanisms enhance goal congruence between IT and users.

3.5.2 Information Asymmetry
Information asymmetry is the second underlying cause of agency problems. Reduction of
information asymmetry is achieved primarily by creating an “information system” of monitoring
information (Adams, 1994; Baiman, 1990). Monitoring of InfoSec effectiveness usually is
performed through security assessments and IT audits.
A security assessment is the process of determining whether the existing information security
program is adequately addressing the firm’s security risks and is promptly updated for changes in
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business (Kairab, 2005; Snedaker, 2006). Depending on a company’s specific needs, the scope
of assessment can go from a simple network scanning to penetration testing. Or the assessment
can be performed with more technical focus such as a penetration test or with more business
focus in the form of a risk assessment. Under certain circumstances, intensive and purposive
assessment in the form of a formal audit can be performed (Kairab, 2005; Maiwald and Sieglein,
2002). Security assessments inform business users and top management of what IT is doing to
protect information assets and how they are performing in that respect. Governance mechanisms
help to reduce the information asymmetry by implementing a process to ensure regular security
assessments and assessment results that are objective and comprehensible to the principal.

Process-based mechanisms help companies to organize IT processes into a manageable number
of control objectives. The benefits include formalization of IT processes, standard language of
communication, and usable metrics of IT performance. These fit well with the checklist
methodology that audits usually adopt. For instance, based on the CobiT system of organizing
IT processes and metrics, ITGI has also created an Audit Guidelines for IT audits. They enable
the auditors to review specific IT processes that are most relevant to the audit purpose at hand.
In addition, these frameworks also create a common terminology inside the firm that makes
interpretation and comparison of audit results much easier. Therefore,
H1b: Process governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and users.

Proper implementation of structural mechanisms establishes an independent feedback channel
and assures users high quality feedback (monitoring) information (Jordan and Silcock, 2005).
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For instance, an important mission of the audit committee is to ensure the independence of the IS
audit function, which, ideally, should report directly to the audit committee. Independence of the
audit function allows auditors to be free from undue influence, monitor fairly, and serve the
organization’s overall goals by focusing on the risks most critical to the business (Rittinghouse
and Hancock, 2003; Schweitzer, 1987; Straub, 1988). Also, if the committee has representatives
from every major group in the firm, adequate coverage of information security issues related to
each of the groups is ensured (Rittinghouse and Hancock, 2003). As the result, the monitoring
information gathered is most likely to be complete, impartial, and suitable to the firm’s business
needs. With this faithful audit information, users will be better informed of actions by the IT
group and the state of organizational information security. Therefore,
H2b: Structural governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and
users.

Relational mechanisms enhance communication and understanding between IT and users.
With better understanding of IT staffers’ qualifications, their work environment, their profession,
their risk stance, and their basic approach to problem solving qualifications, users are better
informed to interpret and evaluate security audit results. A good relationship motivates IT to
have more interactions with business units and be more willing to furnish users with information
regarding the qualifications of IT personnel and IT’s approaches to and actions for providing
InfoSec services. The result of IT providing information like this is that users arrive in a position
that is better able to evaluate the technology provisioning of the IT group, its recommendations
for information security services, and results of security audits. Therefore,
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H3b: Relational governance mechanisms reduce the information asymmetry between IT and
users.

3.5.3 Governance and Effectiveness of InfoSec Services
Governance mechanisms improve the goal congruence between IT and the internal customers.
Better understanding of “client” goals allows IT to better deliver the information, products, and
services the client desires (Peak and Guynes, 2003). When IT approaches user requirements
with a positive predisposition, it is more willing to respond to the users with better services and
seek out technical solutions, plan resources, and implement proper protection measures so that
assets are better protected. IT is also more willing to support users on their job by providing
InfoSec related services to help them fulfill operational, regulatory, and legal requirements.
Therefore,
H4: Goal congruence between IT and users are positively related to effective InfoSec services.

With reduction in information asymmetry, suboptimal service quality is more likely to result in
“customer complaints” which can lead to IT being “corrected” by management. Proper
monitoring activities such as security assessments help to spot security vulnerabilities and
loopholes and alert the management in a timely manner. Users thus are more informed of IT’s
performance and the effectiveness of security measures in protecting information assets.
Remedy of the problems is more likely to take place promptly and results in better protection of
assets. Also, when evaluating user job performance, the information generated from monitoring
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helps to identify the impact caused by inadequate InfoSec services provided by IT. This
strengthens accountability and encourages IT to do their part to avoid the embarrassment of
being traced down as the obstacle to user job performance. Therefore,
H5: Information asymmetry between IT and users are negatively related to higher effectiveness
in InfoSec services.

3.6 Methodology
To test our research model, a survey was conducted with information security managers. Since
there are no existing scales for the constructs in the model, we developed various items for the
constructs. Following methods suggested by Dillman (2000), Mangione (1995), and Sivo et al.
(Sivo, Saunders, Chang, and Jiang, 2006), paper questionnaires containing those items were
distributed and online versions created. A few sources were solicited for responses. In total 102
responses were received and used for data analysis.

3.6.1 Operationalization of Constructs
Because current research on the three governance mechanisms remains largely on the conceptual
level, we had to create items to measure the implementation of the three types of governance
mechanisms, specifically in the context of information security. The items for governance
mechanisms were derived from academic and practitioner literature on IT governance, in
particular, Lahti and Peterson (2005), ITSMF (2005), Van Grembergen (2004), and Galbraith
(1993), as well as information gathered from the domain experts and conferences.
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The process-based mechanisms were operationalized with regard to the extraction of information
security requirements and security assessments. Items were designed to ask whether security
requirements were effectively extracted and implemented. To avoid bias toward any particular
governance framework such as CobiT, ITIL, or ISO17799, the items captured the key controls
that all frameworks try to achieve, rather than using the terminology specific to a particular
framework.

For structural governance mechanisms, items were created to ask about the formal
organizational units and roles that oversee the information security function and security audits.
With respect to the success of implementation, these questions ask about the various committees
and roles, such as IT steering committee, information security, security audit committee, etc.

Since relational governance mechanisms foster better communication between IT and business
departments in the company, these items were created to measure whether and how a company
implements various methods to encourage the interaction between IT and business users.

Measures of goal congruence were based on the definition of this construct as the extent to
which the relative importance of key performance criteria (Neely and Wilson, 1992;
Wickramasinghe and Ginzberg, 2001) is understood between/among parties. Therefore, the
measures for goal congruence between IT and user departments were based on information from
ITSMF (2005) and Gopal, Krishnan, Mukhopadhyay, and Goldenson (2002).
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Given that information asymmetry occurs when the agent has private information to which the
principal cannot costlessly gain access items were created with this in mind for the context of
this study. One source for this was Gallouj (1997), who theorizes on aspects of information
asymmetry.

To measure the effectiveness of InfoSec services, self-report measures were used. This is largely
due to (a) the intangibility nature of outcomes from InfoSec services, and (b) the sensitive nature
of questionnaire on InfoSec. First, measuring the effectiveness of InfoSec services is inherently
difficult due to the intangible nature of the outcomes from the services. A company usually
benefits from the InfoSec services through mitigation of risks (Purser, 2004). While other
organizational investments can be assessed by tangible financial returns, it is very difficult, if at
all possible, to calculate expected financial returns from InfoSec investments (Newman and
Scholtz, 2003).

Theoretically, the effectiveness of InfoSec services could be measured by summary results from
security assessments an organization has performed. However, it is highly unlikely that
respondents will be able to answer such requests. In fact, asking sensitive questions in an
InfoSec-related questionnaire can prevent recipients from returning the questionnaire, as argued
by Kutolic and Clark (2003).
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Effectiveness of InfoSec services thus has been operationalized as three items asking the
respondent to estimate top management satisfaction with InfoSec services.

3.6.2 Development of Instrument
There are no existing instruments for constructs in the research model. Thus, an instrument was
created. A group of domain experts consisting of information security and IT audit practitioners
in the field were asked to help in the process of instrument development and validation. As the
first step of the instrument development, an initial pool of items was generated based on review
of the extant literature, discussion with the domain experts, and information and input that we
gathered while attending various practitioner conventions on information security and IS audit.

The candidate items in the initial pool were then put through four rounds of Q-sort modeled after
Moore and Benbasat (1991). A different group of four people served as judges in each round.
For the first and second rounds, the judge included a practitioner expert, two Ph.D. students in
the IS field, and a Ph.D. student in a non-IS field. For the third and four rounds, they were a
practitioner expert, an IS Ph.D. student, and two non-IS Ph.D. students.

In the first round, we did not provide constructs and their definitions to the judges. We asked
them to sort the items that they believed should load on the same constructs together and provide
their definition of the constructs. If the judge found any items that were ambiguous or
problematic, they were asked to discuss them with us.
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In the second round, the judges had the constructs and their definitions and sorted each item into
the construct to which they believed the item belonged. Again, ambiguous and problematic
items were discussed.

Based on the results from the first two rounds, we revised the items and put them through
another two rounds of Q-sort. The third round was identical to the first round but conducted with
a different group of judges. Similarly, the fourth round was the same as the second round except
the judges. After these four rounds of Q-sort, 45 items were generated for the six constructs.

Since the security managers usually have more detailed, first-hand knowledge about what and
how IT governance mechanisms are implemented in an organization, we collected answers from
them. For items about goal congruence, information asymmetry, and effectiveness of InfoSec
services, we also obtained, in addition to security managers’ responses, answers from their
supervisors or representative business users as well. Thus the security manager answers could be
compared to business manager answers to evaluate objectivity. Therefore, another set of similar
items for business managers were also created and Q-sorted.

The items were organized into two draft questionnaires – a security manager version and a
business manager version. The business version was pre-tested with graduate students in two
master-level MIS classes for format, wording, and time required to complete. We then pre-tested
the security manager version at a monthly meeting of the local chapter of the Information
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Systems Security Association (ISSA) with 12 security managers. The managers were also asked
to bring the business version back to their company and ask their supervisor to fill them out.
Four business manager versions were returned. Feedback from the pre-tests was used to revise
the questionnaires both in content and format.

3.6.3 Survey Administration
The recipients of the paper questionnaire were primarily IT leaders in the 2006 InformationWeek
500 (IW500) organizations. Each year, the InformationWeek magazine publishes a list of 500
organizations that are considered savvy technology users. Since the publicly available list
includes the name and job title of IT leaders in those organizations, it is a convenient sample for
researchers to contact IT leaders. For example, for their study on InfoSec budgeting process,
Gordon et al (2006) surveyed IW500 companies on a previous year’s list. This study uses the
most up-to-date list at the time of the survey administration. After excluding organizations that
are not based in the U.S. and those organizations whose IT leader information or mailing address
was not available, questionnaires were mailed to 425 organizations.

The paper questionnaire administration largely followed the process as laid out by Dillman
(2000), Mangione (1995), and Sivo et al (2006). Four contacts were made with the recipients at
various points in time: (a) a pre-notice letter notifying the recipients of the upcoming
questionnaire; (b) the complete survey packet; (c) a follow-up postcard to remind the recipient;
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and (d) a second follow-up letter that was accompanied by a replacement questionnaire. These
contacts occurred during the period from the middle of May through late July, 2007.

The questionnaire packet included both a security manager and business manager version. The
former was used to collect responses from security managers, who were defined as the person in
charge of managing the InfoSec function. The latter was targeted at the security manager’s
supervisors, which were referred to as “business managers” and could include CIO,
Executive/Senior VP, CFO, COO, CEO, etc. Since the IT leaders listed in the IW500 list all
were in the “business manager” category, the cover letter asked them to fill out the business
manager version and then forward the other questionnaire to the security manager in their
organizations. The other materials in the packet included, for each version, the IRB-approved
informed consent letter, instruction sheet, a notification postcard, and a business reply mail
(BRM) return envelope. Except the return envelopes, the materials for each version were printed
on a distinct color, color-matched, and pinned together.

The respondents’ anonymity was strictly protected. Both versions of the questionnaire were
anonymous. They had demographic questions that the respondents could optionally answer but
did not ask about the identity of the respondents or the companies they worked for. Each
questionnaire had a pre-stamped sequence number but it was exclusively for matching up the
returned questionnaires from the security manager and business manager in the same company.
No individual sequence numbers were recorded and tied to any companies. The notification
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postcards allowed the respondents to inform the researchers only that they had returned the
questionnaire.

In addition, several other sources of potential respondents were tapped. These sources were
members of two professional organizations – Information Systems Audit and Control
Association (ISACA) and Information Systems Security Association (ISSA). To survey these
groups, an online version of the paper questionnaire was created. The ISACA headquarters
included the survey in its Academic Advocate initiative and sent out the URL to its contact list of
information security managers. Two local ISACA chapters sent out email to their members and
solicited participation in the online survey. A local ISSA chapter also encouraged its members to
participate. In addition, members of the advisory boards of two universities were asked to
participate.

At the conclusion of the survey, altogether 102 security manager responses were collected. Out
of these, 53 responses were collected online and 49 were paper-based. Fifty-three business
manager responses (13 online, 40 paper-based) were collected. Between the security manager
and business manager responses, 38 pairs were matched. The job titles of security managers are
listed in Table 3.1 and the industries they represented are listed in Table 3.2.
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Table 3.1 Job Titles of Respondents (Security Managers)

Job Title

Respondents

Chief Information Officer

6

Chief Information Security Officer

21

Chief Security Officer

5

IT Director

13

Security Director

4

Security Manager

23

Security Specialist (Security analyst, architect, engineer, trainer, etc.)

21

Prefer not to disclose

9

Total

102
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Table 3.2 Industry of Respondents (Security Managers)

Industry

Respondents

Automotive

1

Banking and Financial Services

15

Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals

2

Chemicals

1

Consulting

7

Consumer Goods

1

Distribution

1

Energy and Utilities

2

Health Care and Medical

6

Hospitality and Travel

2

Information Technology

7

Insurance

5

Logistics and Transportation

2

Manufacturing

5

Media and Entertainment

2

Metal and Natural Resources

1

Retail: General Merchandising

2

Retail: Specialty Merchandising

1

Telecommunications

3

Education

4

Public Sector

8

Prefer not to disclose

24

Total

102
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3.7 Data Analyses
Partial Least Square (PLS) is used to analyze the data. We use PLS because PLS is more
suitable for theory building and exploratory studies (Gefen, Straub, and Boudreau, 2000) and
there are formative constructs in the model (Petter, Straub, and Rai, 2007). In particular,
SmartPLS (Temme, Kreis, and Hildebrandt, 2006) was used.

Since the instrument was created for this study and no pre-existing scales were used, the first
stage of data analysis was to validate the items in the instrument. Three of the six new constructs
are reflective and the other three are formative.

3.7.1 Content Validity
Content validity is the extent to which items represent all of the ways that could be used to
measure of the content of a given construct (Straub, Boudreau, and Gefen, 2004). Content
validity is not easy to assess and is established with literature reviews and expert judges. It is
highly recommended but not mandatory for IS studies (Straub et al, 2004). For this study, we
examined content validity during the process of the four rounds of Q-sorts and via discussion
with domain experts.
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3.7.2 Construct Validity
Construct validity assesses whether the items designed for a construct really measure what they
are supposed to measure. It is typically evaluated by convergent validity and discriminant
validity.

3.7.2.1 Convergent Validity Test with PCA
When convergent validity is good, indicators for the same construct are more correlated with one
another than with any other indicators for other constructs. For reflective constructs, indicators
should be highly correlated and interchangeable. Purging of problematic indicators is
recommended (Petter et al, 2007). Convergent validity can be established using factor analytic
techniques such as PCA, confirmatory factor analysis, etc. (Straub et al, 2004). After crossloading items are dropped, indicators should load cleanly on their respective constructs. In
comparison, indicators for a formative construct measure different aspects of the construct and
thus may not correlate with each other closely. Convergent validity of formative indicators,
therefore, are established using conceptual methods such as Q-sorts (Petter et al, 2007).

Since constructs in various causal stage (independent variables, mediators, or dependent
variables) by design are correlated, indicators of constructs in different causal stages could cross
load or result in poor loadings for constructs that were otherwise valid. Thus, Straub et al (2004)
recommend that factorial validity examines the constructs independent of the theoretical
connections. In other words, it is best not to mix IVs and DVs in factoring.
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Following this advice, we perform a PCA on the 24 items that are intended to measure the three
independent variables: process-based governance mechanisms (PG), structural governance
mechanisms (SG), and relational governance mechanisms (RG). Kaiser’s criterion is used to
extract all factors with a eigenvalue greater than 1. The solution is rotated orthogonally with
Varimax rotation. Although six factors are extracted in the first run, the scree plot clearly
(Figure 3.2) shows that in fact three factors are a more appropriate number to extract.

Figure 3.2 Scree Plot from First Principal Component Analysis

This is in agreement with the fact that these 24 items are designed to measure three constructs.
After the items loading on multiple or unintended constructs were dropped, the final solution
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retained five indicators for PG, four items for SG, and four items for RG. The loadings of the
items are listed in Table 3.3.

Table 3.3 Item Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (Independent Variables)
Factor
PG

SG

RG

PG1POL

.796

.076

.205

PG2STD

.834

.101

.080

PG4RKA

.642

.311

.302

PG6CHG

.658

.252

.188

PG8EAU

.707

.223

.022

SG1STR

.183

.505

.488

SG3BGT

.079

.638

.072

SG4ACA

.280

.861

.181

SG5ACB

.255

.851

.134

RG3EVT

.420

.025

.661

RG4XFT

.273

.298

.723

RG5COL

.008

.052

.797

RG6CCY

.100

.179

.859

Factors extracted with Keiser’s criterion of eignevalue greater than 1.
Rotation method: Varimax.

When evaluating the loadings, for a sample size of 100, .512 is recommended (Field, 2005;
Stevens, 2002). All the items retained, except SG1STR, load on their related constructs with
loadings substantially higher than .512. SG1STR also loads high on RG. However, since it is an
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important type of structural governance mechanisms, we retain it tentatively, pending further
validation.

There are a few other statistics used to evaluate the appropriateness of the final rotated solution.
Although a certain degree of multicollinearity is in fact necessary for factor analysis, excessive
multicollinearity lessens the distinction between factors. The R-matrix of the final solution has a
determinant of .001, signifying a sufficient but not excessive level of multicollinearity. The
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) statistic is .808. A KMO value above .8 is considered very good
and indicates a high likelihood that the factor analysis yields distinct and reliable factors. The
measures of sampling adequacy (MSAs) are all above the .5 acceptable level, with many of them
above .8, a level that is considered meritorious (Field, 2005; Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black,
1998). Table 3.4 lists the communalities and MSAs for the final solution for the independent
variables.
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Table 3.4 Communalities and MSA for Final Rotation (Independent Variables)

Communalities

MSA

PG1POL

.682

.867

PG2STD

.713

.816

PG4RKA

.601

.885

PG6CHG

.531

.915

PG8EAU

.551

.862

SG1STR

.526

.887

SG3BGT

.419

.806

SG4ACA

.852

.688

SG5ACB

.808

.664

RG3EVT

.613

.824

RG4XFT

.687

.847

RG5COL

.639

.778

RG6CCY

.781

.809

The dependent variable, effectiveness of InfoSec services (ES), is a reflective construct. Another
PCA is performed on the items for the endogenous variables. Again, the items demonstrate high
loadings on the ES construct (See Table 3.5).
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Table 3.5 Item Loadings from Principal Component Analysis (Dependent Variables)
Component
GC

IA

ES

GC1WHA

.824

.066

.180

GC2WHO

.861

.062

.190

GC3PRI

.881

-.031

.211

GC4RSC

.771

.038

.299

GC5FSB

.863

.054

.275

GC6EXP

.836

.138

.069

GC7MTR

.760

-.046

.129

IA1CMP

.076

.807

.115

IA2EXP

.061

.828

.137

IA3ACT

.041

.877

.040

IA4EFT

-.002

.821

-.011

IA5QUL

.013

.843

.059

IA6RND

.034

.688

.140

ES1SRV

.403

.144

.777

ES2PTN

.259

.108

.810

ES3SUP

.282

.173

.880

For formative constructs such as goal congruence and information asymmetry (IA), high
loadings for all indicators are not absolutely necessary (Petter et al, 2007). Therefore, we also
retain the items for GC and IA for further validation. Thus, 29 items are retained. These items,
as well as the complete wording for the items, are listed in Table 3.6. Their means and standard
deviations are listed in Table 3.7.

85

Table 3.6 Retained Items and Complete Wording

Code

Item

Process-based Governance Mechanisms
PG1POL

In my company, users’ requirements for information security are addressed in information
security policies.

PG2STD

In my company, users’ requirements for information security are addressed in information
security standards.

PG4RKA

In my company, risk assessment is performed before information security services are
planned.

PG6CHG

In my company, proper change management procedures are followed when information
security plans are updated for changes in user requirements for information security.

PG8EAU

In my company, external IS audits are performed regularly by accounting firms, contractors,
etc.

Structural Governance Mechanisms
SG1STR

In my company, the IT steering committee (or its equivalent) is effective in deciding strategic
IT matters.

SG3BGT

In my company, the IT budget committee (or its equivalent) is effective in overseeing IT
budget matters.

SG4ACA

In my company, the IS audit committee (or its equivalent) is effective in overseeing IS audit
matters.

SG5ACB

In my company, the IS audit committee (or its equivalent) is composed of members with
backgrounds in various business functions.

Relational Governance Mechanisms
RG3EVT

My company often sponsors events where we (security organization) interact with employees
in other departments.

RG4XFT

My company implements cross-functional training between us (security organization) and
other departments.

RG5COL

My company physically locates our offices so that we (security organization) have maximum
interaction with employees in important departments.

RG6CCY

My company Encourages us (security organization) and other departments to cc each other,
when appropriate, on important decisions.

86

Code

Item

Goal Congruence
GC1WHA

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on What information assets to protect.

GC2WHO

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on who in the security organization implements which security mechanisms.

GC3PRI

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on the priorities of information security.

GC4RSC

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on the allocation of resources for information security.

GC5FSB

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on the feasibility of implementing information security services.

GC6EXP

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on the expected results for information security.

GC7MTR

In my company, we (security organization) and other departments generally have consensus
on the metrics to define the success of information security.

Information Asymmetry
IA1CMP

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about The precise level of our own competence in implementing information security
mechanisms.

IA2EXP

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about the precise level of our own experience in implementing information security
mechanisms.

IA3ACT

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about what we (security organization) are doing to protect information assets.

IA4EFT

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about the amount of effort we (security organization) are exerting.

IA5QUL

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about the quality of services we (security organization) provide to protect information assets.

IA6RND

In my company, we (security organization) have more information than other departments do
about the random, external factors that may influence our effectiveness in protecting
information assets.

Effectiveness of InfoSec Services
ES1SRV

In my company, top management, in general, is satisfied with the services provided by us
(security organization) to protect information assets.

ES2PTN

In my company, top management, in general, is confident that information assets are well
protected.

ES3SUP

In my company, top management, in general, feels that the level of information security
supports its jobs well.
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Table 3.7 Descriptive Statistics
Item

Mean

Std. Deviation

PG1POL
PG2STD
PG4RKA
PG6CHG
PG8EAU

3.88
3.60
3.06
3.43
3.92

1.163
1.137
1.209
1.231
1.272

SG1STR
SG3BGT
SG4ACA
SG5ACB

3.31
2.90
2.32
2.23

1.398
1.592
1.889
1.825

RG3EVT
RG4XFT
RG5COL
RG6CCY

2.56
2.61
2.86
3.34

1.271
1.204
1.365
1.294

GC1WHA
GC2WHO
GC3PRI
GC4RSC
GC5FSB
GC6EXP
GC7MTR

3.51
3.67
3.42
3.00
3.16
3.38
2.91

1.174
1.127
1.188
1.135
1.132
1.217
1.228

IA1CMP
IA2EXP
IA3ACT
IA4EFT
IA5QUL
IA6RND

3.98
4.04
3.88
3.82
3.69
3.87

.832
.922
.915
.999
.931
.951

ES1SRV
ES2PTN
ES3SUP

3.75
3.72
3.62

.927
.924
.932

88

After the exploratory factor analysis, and the retaining of 16 items for PG, SG, RG, and ES, and
13 items for GC and IA, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis using PLS to validate the
convergent and discriminant validity of the items. In a PLS model, each item is designated to
load on the construct that it measures. Then the measurement and structural model are estimated
using the PLS algorithm. As standard in PLS analysis, bootstrap samples are then generated to
estimate the significance of item loadings and path coefficients.

3.7.2.2 Convergent Validity Test with PLS
Items show convergent validity when they load with significant t-values on its construct and at
least the .05 significance level is desired (Gefen and Straub, 2005). For this study, the retained
items and the constructs they load on, as well as the corresponding t-values, are listed in Table
3.8. As can be deduced from the table, all these loadings are at the .001 significance level.

3.7.2.3 Discriminant Validity Test with PLS
To test the discriminant validity of the items, first we examine the item loadings on the
constructs. Table 3.9 shows the loadings of each item on each of the constructs.
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Table 3.8 Significance of Item Loadings
Item

Construct

Original
Sample

Sample
Mean

Standard
Deviation

Standard
Error

T Statistic

PG1POL

PG

0.7968

0.7962

0.0402

0.0402

19.8307

PG2STD

PG

0.8048

0.7921

0.0619

0.0619

13.0080

PG4RKA

PG

0.7894

0.7821

0.0532

0.0532

14.8349

PG6CHG

PG

0.7670

0.7793

0.0413

0.0413

18.5746

PG8EAU

PG

0.7144

0.7140

0.0624

0.0624

11.4572

SG1STR

SG

0.7693

0.7473

0.0566

0.0566

13.5852

SG3BGT

SG

0.5841

0.5863

0.1133

0.1133

5.1558

SG4ACA

SG

0.8939

0.8991

0.0347

0.0347

25.7700

SG5ACB

SG

0.8490

0.8550

0.0528

0.0528

16.0873

RG3EVT

RG

0.7662

0.7692

0.0616

0.0616

12.4445

RG4XFT

RG

0.8516

0.8517

0.0305

0.0305

27.9532

RG5COL

RG

0.7421

0.7411

0.0637

0.0637

11.6595

RG6CCY

RG

0.8693

0.8703

0.0215

0.0215

40.3861

GC1WHA

GC

0.8125

0.7834

0.0689

0.0689

11.7953

GC2WHO

GC

0.8478

0.8286

0.0689

0.0689

12.2964

GC3PRI

GC

0.9072

0.8785

0.0422

0.0422

21.4780

GC4RSC

GC

0.8330

0.8035

0.0659

0.0659

12.6434

GC5FSB

GC

0.9592

0.9284

0.0389

0.0389

24.6482

GC6EXP

GC

0.8088

0.8014

0.1052

0.1052

7.6880

GC7MTR

GC

0.6883

0.6829

0.0916

0.0916

7.5163

IA1CMP

IA

0.7850

0.5665

0.2634

0.2634

2.9798

IA2EXP

IA

0.7832

0.5932

0.2588

0.2588

3.0263

IA3ACT

IA

0.6715

0.4712

0.2691

0.2691

2.4958

IA4EFT

IA

0.3876

0.3528

0.2568

0.2568

1.5093

IA5QUL

IA

0.6450

0.4617

0.2672

0.2672

2.4140

IA6RND

IA

0.8268

0.5838

0.2906

0.2906

2.8454

ES1SRV

ES

0.9102

0.9123

0.0187

0.0187

48.5781

ES2PTN

ES

0.8301

0.8284

0.0640

0.0640

12.9747

ES3SUP

ES

0.9432

0.9427

0.0129

0.0129

73.0782
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Table 3.9 Item Loadings
PG

SG

RG

GC

IA

ES

PG1POL

0.7968

0.3707

0.3858

0.4262

0.1078

0.3947

PG2STD

0.8048

0.3448

0.2985

0.3365

0.1960

0.2592

PG4RKA

0.7894

0.5230

0.4665

0.4609

0.1776

0.3875

PG6CHG

0.7670

0.4522

0.3627

0.4821

0.0712

0.4698

PG8EAU

0.7144

0.3662

0.2561

0.3099

0.1119

0.2904

SG1STR

0.4272

0.7693

0.5100

0.5798

-0.0097

0.4337

SG3BGT

0.2622

0.5841

0.2184

0.2561

0.0164

0.1798

SG4ACA

0.4972

0.8939

0.4025

0.4611

0.1054

0.3700

SG5ACB

0.4572

0.8490

0.3696

0.4106

0.1256

0.3444

RG3EVT

0.4771

0.3422

0.7662

0.4514

0.2494

0.2923

RG4XFT

0.4618

0.5215

0.8516

0.6240

0.1927

0.3741

RG5COL

0.2325

0.2943

0.7421

0.4888

0.1683

0.3483

RG6CCY

0.3433

0.4504

0.8693

0.6319

0.2218

0.4125

GC1WHA

0.4286

0.4245

0.5867

0.8125

0.1845

0.4589

GC2WHO

0.4631

0.5050

0.5726

0.8478

0.0983

0.4821

GC3PRI

0.4533

0.5505

0.6372

0.9072

0.0632

0.5041

GC4RSC

0.4187

0.4908

0.5181

0.8330

0.1573

0.5250

GC5FSB

0.5058

0.5467

0.6567

0.9592

0.1521

0.5535

GC6EXP

0.4898

0.4394

0.5895

0.8088

0.1905

0.4256

GC7MTR

0.4081

0.3604

0.4724

0.6883

0.0475

0.3953

IA1CMP

0.1036

0.0116

0.1919

0.1461

0.7850

0.2400

IA2EXP

0.1285

0.1100

0.1944

0.1320

0.7832

0.2663

IA3ACT

0.1306

-0.0280

0.1258

0.0824

0.6715

0.2083

IA4EFT

0.1082

0.0719

0.0861

0.0485

0.3876

0.1313

IA5QUL

0.1218

0.0115

0.1422

0.0723

0.6450

0.1981

IA6RND

0.1845

0.1033

0.2240

0.1040

0.8268

0.2421

ES1SRV

0.4392

0.4128

0.4260

0.5613

0.3316

0.9102

ES2PTN

0.3706

0.3754

0.3056

0.4695

0.1873

0.8301

ES3SUP

0.4631

0.4149

0.4506

0.4976

0.2864

0.9432
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As Gefen and Straub (2005) point out, it is common to have much higher loadings in PLS than in
a PCA; a loading above .7 is considered high. As Table 3.9 shows, each indicator of PG, SG,
RG, and ES loads much higher on the construct than on any other constructs. This can be
verified by either examining horizontally an item’s loadings across all constructs or, vertically,
loadings on a construct across all items. The same can be observed in our results from the PCA
(Tables 3.3 and 3.5).

Also, SG1STR’s loading on SG is at least “an order of magnitude” (Gefen and Straub, 2005, p.
93) higher than its loadings on other constructs. Therefore, we decide to retain this item.

Analysis of average variance extracted (AVE) is the next step in testing discriminant validity. A
construct with good discriminant validity should have an AVE whose square root is above .50
and much higher than any correlation among any pairs of constructs (Chin, 1998; Gefen and
Straub, 2005). The construct AVEs are listed in Table 3.10 and their correlation coefficients are
shown in Table 3.11. As can be deduced from the tables, all of the four constructs meet the
criteria for discriminant validity. In other words, the correlation between each of the constructs
with its measurement items is larger than its correlation with other constructs. Therefore, all the
constructs demonstrate discriminant validity.
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Table 3.10 Average Variance Extracted
Construct

AVE

PG
SG
RG
ES

0.6008
0.6132
0.6547
0.8024

Square
Root
0.7751
0.7831
0.8091
0.8958

Table 3.11 Correlations between Constructs
PG

SG

RG

GC

IA

ES

PG

.

SG

0.5396

.

RG

0.4679

0.5065

.

GC

0.5313

0.5755

0.6867

.

IA

0.1701

0.0739

0.2555

0.1508

.

ES

0.4757

0.4484

0.4443

0.5718

0.3055

.

3.7.2.4 Discriminant Validity Test for Formative Constructs
To validate formative constructs, statistics such as reliability and AVE are not applicable (Chin,
1998; Liang, Saraf, Hu, and Xue, 2007). However, an item that contributes to its construct
should have significant path weights, and these should be examined to evaluate the validity of
those items. As can be seen in Table 3.8, for the two formative constructs, GC and IA, all but
one path is insignificant (IA4EFT). The items therefore contribute significantly to form the
constructs of GC and IA.

93

Although IA4EFT has a low t-value, we decided to retain it because items for formative
constructs measure different aspects of a construct and particular caution should be exercised
when dropping formative indicators (Petter et al, 2007). Conceptually this item makes good
sense and did not raise any concern during Q-sorts. Thus we decide not to drop the item.

3.7.3 Reliability
It is difficult to assess reliability for formative constructs, especially with PLS. For the reflective
constructs, reliability of the scale was verified, i.e., the correlation between any two items should
be positive if they measure the same construct (Petter et al, 2007). Next, we evaluate the
reliability of those items for the reflective constructs. Table 3.12 displays the Cronbach’s alphas
for reflective constructs and they are all above 0.8 expect for SG, which is close to 0.8.

Table 3.12 Reliability
Construct

Alpha

PG

0.8346

SG

0.7867

RG

0.8230

ES

0.8762
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3.7.4 Hypothesis Testing
The relationships between the governance mechanisms, goal congruence, information
asymmetry, and effectiveness of information security services are shown in Figure 3.3. In total,
the R2 of .376 indicates that the model explains a large amount of variance in the effectiveness of
InfoSec services.

Figure 3.3 Structural Model

The path coefficients for the relationships between constructs are displayed in Figure 3.4. The
significance (t values) for those coefficients is shown in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.4 Path Coefficients (SmartPLS Output)
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Figure 3.5 Path Significance (SmartPLS Output)
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The structural model shows that all three types of governance mechanisms are positively related
to goal congruence between IT and business. SG and RG are strongly related to GC at .02
and .001 level, respectively, while PG is related to GC at the .10 level. GC, in turn, is strongly
related to ES at the .001 level. Therefore, H1a, H2a, H3a, and H4 are supported.

Interesting findings results surface when information asymmetry (IA) is involved. The
relationships between IA and each of the three types of governance mechanisms are all
insignificant. Therefore, H1b, H2b, and H3b are not supported.

Since the indicators of IA are self-report measures, a suspicion is that these may be due to the
lack of objectivity of what the security managers reported. Thus, we pair up the answers to GC
and IA items by the security manager and the business manager from the same organization.
Since all together only 38 pairs were found, the small sample size prevent us from running
another equivalent model by using the security manager answers to the governance mechanisms
items and the business manager answers to the GC, IA, and ES items. However, a series of ttests on the two groups’ answers to GC and IA items yield some insights regarding these
insignificant relationships. Table 3.13 shows the results of the t-tests.
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Table 3.13 Security and Business Managers Answers to GC and IA Questions

Item

Security
Mean

Business
Mean

Sig.

Item

Security
Mean

Business
Mean

Sig.

GC1WHA

3.97

3.87

.712

IA1CMP

4.18

3.79

.061

GC2WHO

4.11

4.11

1.000

IA2EXP

4.24

3.82

.068

GC3PRI

3.92

3.87

.839

IA3ACT

4.13

3.68

.070

GC4RSC

3.55

3.61

.840

IA4EFT

4.13

3.50

.009

GC5FSB

3.68

3.53

.566

IA5QUL

4.08

3.34

.008

GC6EXP

3.92

3.66

.385

IA6RND

4.26

3.55

.010

GC7MTR

3.16

3.05

.740

* Scale was 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strong Agree (5).

These tests reveal that there are obviously no differences between a security manager’s and a
business manager’s answers to questions about GC. In other words, the security manager and
business manager are very similar in their estimates of goal congruence in their organization. In
contrast, when it comes to their answers to the IA questions, the significance levels of the t-tests
are between .008 and .01. Therefore, there is a fairly high likelihood that the two manager
groups differ in their estimates of information asymmetry in their organizations. More
specifically, security managers tend to see a larger asymmetry than the business managers do.

Another surprising finding we observe in the structural model is the relationship between IA and
ES. There is a significant positive relationship between the two (b = .224, p < .05). Since the IA
questions are not reverse coded, a higher value means that IT has more information than business.
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Therefore, a larger information asymmetry is positively related to more effective InfoSec
services. The sign of relationship thus is the opposite of what H5 hypothesizes.

3.8 Discussion
This study creates and empirically tests a set of measures to gauge a company’s IT governance
mechanisms, goal congruence, information asymmetry, and InfoSec service effectiveness. Our
data analyses first validate the psychometric properties of the instrument. Analyses of the results
collected from security and business managers reveal both expected and surprising but
interesting findings.

First, IT governance mechanisms that are implemented as IT process control techniques,
organizational roles and structures, and relationship building do enhance the goal congruence
between IT and business. In terms of process-based mechanisms, the use of security policies and
standards formalizes and institutes the thought process and practical exercise needed to capture
users’ business and functional requirements for information security. These requirements help to
guide IT in its assessment of the users’ business processes, information assets, and the risks these
processes and assets may entail. If proper risk assessment is performed before InfoSec services
are planned and implemented, the chances are IT will be serving the users’ business objectives
more closely and effectively. Continuous effects can be guaranteed by proper implementation
procedure such as change management and audit of results. Goal congruence also can be
boosted via the use of organizational structures such as IT steering committee, IT budget
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committee, IS audit committee, etc. The IT steering committee is the most tried and true venue
by which IT and non-IT units voice and weigh their IT-related, including InfoSec-related
concerns and priorities. The IT budget committee can put real teeth into agreed-upon IT
priorities. The processes by which this committee works makes sure that those priorities are not
the results of whims of either IT or business. As far as InfoSec is concerned, committees such as
IS audit committee constitute a feedback channel through which IT and business can be on the
same page with regard to where IT stands in protecting users’ information assets and supporting
their business processes. This should prompt IT to anticipate and fulfill user goals for
information security.

The formal processes and organization structures can never replace the informal “lateral
organizations” and informal relationships that users build at work to communicate their goals
and get their job done. Relational governance mechanisms reduce the randomness in those
informal structures and relationships and guide them toward congruent goals. Altogether, the
process-based, structural, and relational mechanisms facilitate goal congruence between IT and
business. Clear understanding of user goals in turn can help IT plan and allocate their priorities
and activities so that it can better serve the users. A direct result from such efforts is that users
see more effective InfoSec services, as judged by the level of protection, business support, and
customer service provided.
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Our research findings strongly support this chain of reasoning. We find significant positive
relationships between each of the three types of mechanisms and goal congruence, and between
goal congruence and InfoSec service effectiveness.

Our findings, however, do not support relationships between the governance mechanisms and
information asymmetry. The asymmetry occurs because business users cannot effortlessly or
costlessly gain access to IT information regarding the InfoSec services. Therefore, the
asymmetry theoretically allows IT to act opportunistically and hurt users. This rather negative
view of information asymmetry is rooted in agency theory. It follows that governance
mechanisms allow users easier access to information on IT competence and actions and, as the
result, IT will not “shirk” and put in more efforts for the betterment of the users (i.e., the
principal). For instance, IS audits done by auditors and impartial audit outcomes guaranteed by a
properly structured audit committee represent a great source of information to reduce asymmetry.
Informal relationships theoretically also enable users to gain insight into what IT does for
InfoSec.

Our analyses, however, show that information asymmetry actually is not related to the
governance mechanisms. A possible explanation may be that the profession of InfoSec is such
that the barrier to acquisition of even shadow knowledge of InfoSec is difficult to surmount.
Contributing to the reinforcement of such a barrier may be the popular press’ dramatization of
hacking activities and the common, simplistic practice of equating InfoSec to cryptography. As
the result, information asymmetry is not readily amenable to alleviation through governance
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mechanisms. For instance, regardless of what informal relationships that the company fosters
through relational governance mechanisms, a regular user may not have the motivation for more
informal InfoSec education than the security manager’s occasional elevator speeches. It may be
much less enticing for a CEO to leaf through an IS audit report than to peruse a financial audit
report, which she may feel less daunting to start with.

In fact, the lack of expertise typically is the reason for a principal to delegate a task to an agent.
In the case of InfoSec, business leaders may view the information asymmetry between IT and
users a legitimate existence. This possibly explains the unexpected finding that information
asymmetry is positively related to InfoSec service effectiveness. Business leaders entrust IT
with InfoSec tasks and may view widening information asymmetry as a sign of IT working hard
on InfoSec. Indeed, to be more effective in providing security, IT tends to implement more
sophisticated protection measures and build a wealth of information that is harder to comprehend
by laypersons. Even if a layperson tries to obtain information on what IT is doing, advances in
technologies and attack and protection measures can easily outpace the asymmetry reduction
process. Therefore, it is likely that more effective protection comes at the cost of higher
information asymmetry, especially when the business leaders do not view it as something
negative that needs to be tamed.

3.9 Theoretical Contribution
Our study contributes to both the IT governance and agency theory literature as discussed below.
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3.9.1 IT Governance
A major contribution of this study is to create an instrument to measure various aspects of IT
governance. To date, much of the discussion regarding IT governance mechanisms (e.g.,
Peterson, 2004a, 2004b; Van Grembergen et al, 2004) has been conceptual. Weill and Ross’
study (Weill and Ross, 2004) is empirical but the focus is on the organizing logic of decision
rights. Their attention is primarily on the structural mechanisms. This study marks an early
effort to empirically measure IT governance practices. Given the purpose of this study, and
considering that IT governance is a far-reaching concept, the instrument measures those
governance mechanisms that are related to InfoSec. Using survey data, the instrument was
validated and shown to have satisfactory construct validity. Future studies thus can take
advantage of this set of scales for empirical measurement of security governance.

An important utility of IT governance is to ensure the alignment of IT and business goals (Peak
and Guynes, 2003; Weill and Ross, 2004). This study indeed supports this hypothesis by
showing that IT governance mechanisms enhances the goal congruence between IT and business,
at least as far as InfoSec services are concerned. While there are previous efforts like Luftman
(2000) to measure the alignment between IT and business, this study makes a contribution by
coming up with and testing a much more parsimonious set of measures.
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3.9.2 Agency Theory
Baiman (1982) suggests that an approach to empirical validation of the agency theory is to
concentrate less on deriving optimal compensation contracts because its discussion often is based
on assumptions and lacks real-life counterparts. Rather, more fruitful research should
concentrate more on more easily observed aspects of the firm.

Like Baiman, Nilakant and Rao (1994) suggest that there seems to be a saturation in studies on
contract design. Thus, they recommend studying reduction of agency problems through
organizational design, trust, and collaboration. In this regard, Nilakan and Rao stress structural
and cultural mechanisms. Both are examined in this study, with relational mechanisms being
equivalent to cultural mechanisms.

Thus, this study contributes to agency theory in performing a much needed test from a concrete,
organizational perspective. Instead of simplistically using compensation structure as the cure-all
solution to agency problems, it peeks into the richness of the variety of governance mechanisms
that are at the tips of organization for solving their agency problems.

Although goal congruence and information asymmetry are the standard-issue elements in most,
if not all, discourse on agency theory, they are bypassed in empirical studies. The hypothesized
causal link typically goes straight from whatever causal factors in focus to some sort of
performance measure. This study thus makes an important contribution by explicating this black
box of causal relationship and studying the role of these two factors explicitly.
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More specifically, information asymmetry is generally viewed in a negative light because it
allows the agent to hide information away from the principal and be able to act opportunistically
(Baiman, 1990; Pavlou, Liang, and Xue, 2007). Thus, it should be reduced (Baiman, 1990). By
looking at information asymmetry specifically, this study finds at least one situation in which
information asymmetry may not be all bad and possibly even is indicative of the effectiveness of
the agent’s actions. Another contribution is that we create a set of theory-based items to measure
information asymmetry in the InfoSec context and validate it empirically.

Thus, this study contributes to the IT governance and agency theory literature both by taking a
closer look at some pivotal constructs and by creating and validating parsimonious sets of scales
to measure key constructs. These contributions are tabulated in Table 3.14.
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Table 3.14 Theoretical Contribution

Literature
IT Governance

Contribution
Studies governance from the perspective of rich sets of
mechanisms.
Creates and validates scales for measuring governance practices
in the InfoSec context. Future empirical studies of information
security governance can take advantage of the instrument.
Provides a parsimonious set of scale to assess goal alignment
between business and IT in the InfoSec context.

Agency Theory

Explicates the black box of causal relationships between agency
problem control measures and effectiveness.
Validates the role of goal congruence in controlling agency
problems. Brings attention to reconsidering the role of information
asymmetry.
Provides a set of scales to measure information asymmetry in the
InfoSec context.

3.10 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
This study is an early effort to empirically measure and test governance practices from the
perspective of governance mechanisms. Although our validation process and results suggest that
the measurement scales very likely have desirable psychometric properties, it is early to call that
conclusive. Also, the external validity of this study can be limited. This is for two reasons. First,
the scope of this study is intentionally limited to information security and more specifically, with
relation to understanding and fulfilling users’ InfoSec requirements. While this makes the scope
of study manageable and measurement scales usable, it is unclear whether the findings can be
extended to other IT contexts. Second, given various resource limitations, we are able to collect
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responses only from a relatively small set of security managers and business managers.
Researchers of future studies may want to try different channels to collect data from a larger set
of security managers to validate the findings in this study.

Another type of replication that is suitable for future studies is to design sets of similar measures
for other IT contexts and examine the usability of those instruments in those contexts. If the
instruments demonstrate good psychometric properties and practical usability, it bolsters the
value of our scales. A general set of scales to measure IT governance practices across various IT
contexts may even be possible. The same can be said of the items we create to measure goal
congruence and information asymmetry.

It definitively will be interesting for researchers to further investigate the role of information
asymmetry in agency relationships. Whereas the importance of goal congruence is fairly
straightforward, the role played by information asymmetry appears to be more complex than has
been postulated by theorists and researchers. It may be because the asymmetry is the reason for
agency relationships to begin with. Usually, the asymmetry in specialized knowledge gives rise
to the agency theory. However, at least in theory, it also causes further asymmetry in terms of
knowledge about the task performance. We try to differentiate between these two types of
asymmetry and term them expertise-based asymmetry and performance-based asymmetry and
design our scales around the latter. We believe that the expertise-based asymmetry is what gives
legitimacy to agency relationships and thus not what is at play in agency problems. What we try
to capture is the performance-based asymmetry, which is the “bad” asymmetry that needs to be
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reduced. However, our findings seem to suggest that even performance-based asymmetry may
be viewed by the principal as legitimate. Future studies may investigate in more depth the
differences in expertise-based asymmetry and performance-based asymmetry and their
respective roles in agency relationships and problems. It is possible that the principal’s
acceptance of the asymmetry can depend on the context. For relatively simple tasks such as
retail sales or customer service, the principal (the mangers) may not want to allow the agent (the
cashier or customer service representative) much privilege to the service information. For more
complex tasks such as building security defenses for a data center, reduction in asymmetry may
not mean as much to the principal. Future research in this direction may yield interesting
findings that enrich our understanding of agency theory.

3.11 Conclusion
This study addresses a timely and important issue in information security management that is
receiving attention recently – the proper governance of the security function. Governance is the
key to ensuring that IT provides InfoSec services in such a way that information assets are sound
and safe and business strategies and objectives are well served by those services. With this study
we delve into the various governance mechanisms and examine their efficacy on governance by
adopting an agency theory perspective. We hypothesize that the mechanisms have their effects
through improving goal congruence and reducing information asymmetry between IT and
business. We conduct a survey to collect responses from security managers and business
managers to test our hypotheses. The analyses of survey data partially support our hypotheses
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but bring up intriguing questions about the role of information symmetry in the agency
relationships in the InfoSec context. We believe it is a research direction for future studies in
information security governance and agency theory. Another direction that is worth future
research efforts is the measurement of IT governance practices. To conduct this study we create
and validate a set of measure scales for the three categories of governance mechanisms that have
been conceptually defined but untested in literature. With researchers’ interest in IT and security
governance on the rise, parsimonious, usable, and psychometrically sound scales of IT
governance practices are indispensable for empirical studies in that area.
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Information security (InfoSec) The protection of information and its critical elements,
including the systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information.
Confidentiality

The absence of unauthorized access, disclosure, and use of information.

Integrity Information is trustworthy and reliable because it has not been altered or corrupted
by unauthorized users or computer processes
Availability
assets

The authorized users’ ability to have timely and reliable access to information

IT governance The organizational capacity to ensure that IT sustains and extends the
organization’s strategy. It as the responsibility of the board of directors and executive
management.
Process-based governance mechanisms IT management techniques that ensure that daily
behaviors are consistent with IT policies and that all stakeholders are involved in the effective
management and use of IT.
Structural governance mechanisms Organizational units and roles that are instituted to
properly locate decision-making responsibilities, to promote horizontal connection between IT
and business functions.
Relational governance mechanisms Organizational practices that encourage voluntary twoway communication and collaboration between business and IT
Goal congruence The extent to which the relative importance of key performance criteria,
including the achievability of goals, are understood between/among parties.
Information asymmetry The situation in which the agent has private information to which
the principal cannot costlessly gain access.
Effectiveness of InfoSec Services The extent to which the services are delivered successfully,
in terms of business impact, service delivery, and the efficacy of implementation.
Adverse selection An agency problem in which the agent exerts the inappropriate type of
effort. In this situation, the principal is unable to determine the agent’s qualifications and
abilities and whether the agent’s decisions and actions are in the principal’s best interest.
Moral hazard An agency problem in which the agent exercises inadequate effort. In this
situation, the principal is unable to verify the quantity and quality of the agent’s efforts.
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Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (CobiT) An IT governance
tool created by IT Governance Institute (ITGI). CobiT is a process-based governance framework
that covers the entire life cycle of IT systems.
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) A set of publications developed
and endorsed by IT Service Management Forum (ITSMF) that describe the best practices in IT
processes. It has a strong focus on IT service delivery and management.
Code of Practice for Information Security Management (ISO/IEC 17799:2005) An
international standard governing information security management. It provides a series of
systematic recommendations and best practices for implementing and managing information
security program.
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IT Governance and Information Security Survey
Security Manager
Manager Version
Versione
Security

Time to complete: Approximately 15 minutes
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with each of the following statements (1=Strongly Disagree, 3 = Neither Agree
nor Disagree, 5 = Strongly Agree):

In my company, processes are in place to
ensure that…
Strongly
Disagree

In my company…

1. Users’ requirements for
information security are
addressed in information
security policies.

1

2

3

4

5

2. Users’ requirements for
information security are
addressed in information
security standards.

1

2

3

4

5

3. Users’ requirements for
information security are
expressed as formal or
informal internal service
level agreements (SLAs)
between us (security
organization) and users.

1

4. Risk assessment is
performed before
information security
services are planned.

1

2

3

4

5

5. Information security
plans are updated in a
timely manner to address
changes in user
requirements for
information security.

1

2

3

4

5

6. Proper change
management procedures
are followed when
information security plans
are updated for changes in
user requirements for
information security.

1

7. Internal IS audits are
performed regularly.

1

2

3

4

5

8. External IS audits are
performed regularly by
accounting firms,
contractors, etc.

1

2

3

4

5

9. Regular security
assessments (e.g.,
penetration tests) are
performed by internal
testers.

1

2

3

4

5

10. Regular security
assessments (e.g.,
penetration tests) are
performed by external
testers such as
consultants.

1

2

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

3

4

5

Strongly
Agree

11. Liaisons or relationship
managers in business
units manage the
relationship with the
security organization.

1

2

3

4

5

12. A liaison or relationship
manager in the security
organization manages the
relationship with other
departments.

1

2

3

4

5

13. Business units often
invite us (security
organization) to attend
business conferences with
them.

1

2

3

4

5

14. We (security
organization) often invite
employees in business
units to attend information
security conferences with
us.

1

2

3

4

5

My company…
Strongly
Disagree

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

Strongly
Agree

15. Often sponsors events
where we (security
organization) interact with
employees in other
departments.

1

2

3

4

5

16. Implements crossfunctional training between
us (security organization)
and other departments.

1

2

3

4

5

17. Physically locates our
offices so that we (security
organization) have
maximum interaction with
employees in important
departments.

1

2

3

4

5

18. Encourages us (security
organization) and other
departments to cc each
other, when appropriate,
on important decisions.

1

2

3

4

5

Continued on back. Please turn over.

In my company…
19. The IT steering committee (or its
equivalent) is…

Non-existent
Ad Hoc Only
Permanent (meets regularly)

If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer
Question 19A.
Strongly Disagree
19A. The IT steering committee (or its
equivalent) is effective in deciding
strategic IT matters.

1

2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to
Question 20.
20. The information security committee (or
its equivalent) is…

Non-existent
Ad Hoc Only
Permanent (meets regularly)

If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer
Question 20A.
Strongly Disagree
20A. The information security
committee (or its equivalent) is
effective in overseeing important
information security matters.

1

2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to
Question 21.
21. The IT budget committee (or its
equivalent) is…

Non-existent
Ad Hoc Only
Permanent (meets regularly)

If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer
Question 21A.
Strongly Disagree
21A. The IT budget committee (or its
equivalent) is effective in overseeing
IT budget matters.

1

2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to
Question 22.
22. The IS audit committee (or its
equivalent) is…

Non-existent
Ad Hoc Only
Permanent (meets regularly)

If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer
Questions 22A and 22B.
Strongly Disagree
22A. The IS audit committee (or its
equivalent) is effective in overseeing
IS audit matters.

1

2

Strongly Agree
3

Strongly Disagree
22B. The IS audit committee (or its
equivalent) is composed of
members with backgrounds in
various business functions.
If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to
Question 23.

Continued on next page.

1

2

4

5

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

23. The internal IS audit department (or its
equivalent) is…

Non-existent
Permanent

Ad Hoc Only

If your answer is “ad hoc only” or “permanent", please also answer
Question 23A.
Strongly Disagree
23A. The internal IS audit department (or
its equivalent) is not influenced by
other departments.

1

2

Strongly Agree
3

4

5

If your answer is “non-existent”, please proceed to
Question 24.

In my company, we (security organization) and
other departments generally have consensus
on…
Strongly
Disagree

In my company, we (security organization)
have more information than other departments
do about each of the following:

Strongly
Agree

24. What information assets to
protect.

1

2

3

4

5

25. Who in the security
organization implements
which security mechanisms.

1

2

3

4

5

26. The priorities of
information security.

1

2

3

4

5

27. The allocation of
resources for information
security.

1

2

3

4

5

28. The feasibility of
implementing information
security services.

1

2

3

4

5

29. The expected results for
information security.

1

2

3

4

5

30. The metrics to define the
success of information
security.

1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

35. The quality of services
we (security organization)
provide to protect
information assets.

1

2

3

4

5

36. The random, external
factors that may influence
our effectiveness in
protecting information
assets.

1

2

3

4

5

In my company …

In my company, we (security organization)
have more information than other departments
do about each of the following:
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

37. Top management, in
general, is satisfied with
the services provided by us
(security organization) to
protect information assets.

1

2

3

4

5

38. Employees, in general, are
satisfied with the services
provided by us (security
organization) to protect
information assets.

1

2

3

4

5

39. Top management, in
general, is confident that
information assets are well
protected.

1

2

3

4

5

40. Employees, in general, are
confident that information
assets are well protected.

1

2

3

4

5

31. The precise level of our
own competence in
implementing information
security mechanisms.

1

2

3

4

5

32. The precise level of our
own experience in
implementing information
security mechanisms.

1

2

3

4

5

41. Top management, in
general, feels that the level
of information security
supports its jobs well.

1

2

3

4

5

33. What we (security
organization) are doing to
protect information assets.

1

2

3

4

5

42. Employees, in general,
feel that the level of
information security
supports their jobs well.

1

2

3

4

5

34. The amount of effort we
(security organization)
are exerting.

1

2

3

4

5
Continued on back. Please turn over.

My company implements the following (please check all that apply):
Framework / Standard

How long has it been
implemented (in months)

Comments

CobiT
ITIL
ISO17799
ISO27001/27002
NIST
OCTAVE
Other third-party governance frameworks*
Other in-house governance frameworks*
* Please specify in the “Comments” column.

My position:
Company’s annual
revenue:

Position of the person I
report directly to:
Less than US$1 million
US$1 – 9 million
US$10 – 99 million
US$100 million – 1billion
Greater than US$1billion

Number of employees
in company:

Industry:

1 – 99
100 – 499
500 – 1499
1500 – 9999
10,000 – 49,000
More than 50,000

Thank You!
Next, Please do these…

Insert this questionnaire in the supplied postage-prepaid envelope and mail it back to us.
Write your company name on the attached postage-prepaid notification postcard and drop it in the mail
so that we will know you have responded and will not follow up with you unnecessarily. To ensure your
anonymity, please do not put it into the return envelope with the questionnaire.
Thank you very much for your participation in our research project! If you want to share your insights into
information security issues or to make suggestions regarding this questionnaire, please comment below.

Andy Wu, Department of MIS, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-0014 • (407) 580-4198 • SecurityStudy@gmail.com
Definitions

The organizational unit inside your company that implements and manages information security in your
company, regardless of its name or location in the organizational chart. You have been asked to complete this questionnaire
because of your role inside the security organization. If you are not involved in information security management, please
kindly forward this questionnaire to someone who is in that role.

Security Organization:

Business Units/Other Departments: All other organizational units inside your company aside from the security organization,
whether they are revenue-generating units (production, sales, etc.) or support functions (accounting, legal, etc.).

IT Governance and Information Security Survey
User Representative
Versio
Business
Manager Version

Time to complete: Approximately 10 minutes
Please indicate the degree to which you agree with statements 1-13 and mark your rating for statements 14–38 as instructed.
In my company, the security organization and other
departments generally have consensus on…

With regard to each of the following, my perception of
our security organization's performance is…
(1 = Low, 3 = Average, 5 = High)

Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

High

Low

1. What information assets to
protect.

1

2

3

4

5

14. Providing services as
promised.

1

2

3

4

5

2. Who in the security
organization implements
which security
mechanisms.

1

2

3

4

5

15. Dependability in handling
users' security problems.

1

2

3

4

5

16. Performing security service
right the first time.

1

2

3

4

5

3. The priorities of
information security.

1

2

3

4

5

17. Providing security services
at the promised time.

1

2

3

4

5

4. The allocation of
resources for information
security.

1

2

3

4

5

18. Maintaining reliable
technology and systems.

1

2

3

4

5

5. The feasibility of
implementing information
security services.

1

2

3

4

5

19. Prompt service to users.

1

2

3

4

5

20. Willingness to help users.

1

2

3

4

5

6. The expected results for
information security.

2

3

4

5

2

3

4

5

21. Readiness to respond to
users' requests for security
services.

1

1

7. The metrics to define the
success of information
security.

1

2

3

4

5

22. Making users feel safer in
using information
technologies.

1

2

3

4

5

23. Courtesy when interacting
with users.

1

2

3

4

5

24. Knowledge to answer
users' questions about
threats and protective
solutions.

1

2

3

4

5

25. Giving users individual
attention.

1

2

3

4

5

26. Dealing with users in a
caring fashion.

1

2

3

4

5

27. Having the users' best
interest at heart.

1

2

3

4

5

5

28. Understanding of users'
security needs.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

In my company, the security organization knows a lot
more than I do about…
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

8. The precise level of their
competence in
implementing information
security mechanisms.

1

9. The precise level of their
experience in
implementing information
security mechanisms.

1

10. What they are doing to
protect our information
assets.

1

11. The amount of effort they
are exerting.

1

2

3

4

5

29. Proper maintenance of
security equipment and
facilities.

12. The quality of services
they provide to protect
information assets.

1

2

3

4

5

30. Maintaining
professionalism.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

13. The random, external
factors that may influence
their effectiveness in
protecting information
assets.

1

5

31. Providing useful support
materials (documentation,
training, videos, etc.).

2

2

2

2

3

3

3

3

4

4

4

4

5

5

Continued on back. Please turn over.

Regarding information security in my company, my level of confidence in each of the following is…
(1 = Low, 3 = Average, 5 = High)

Low

High

32. Information is accessible
only to those people who
have a legitimate reason to
access it.

1

2

3

4

5

33. Information is not altered
by people with malicious
intent.

1

2

3

4

5

34. Information is not altered
unintentionally.

1

2

3

4

5

35. Information is available
when needed.

1

2

3

4

5

My position:
Company’s annual
revenue:

Low

High

36. Computer systems remain
up and running without
unplanned downtime.

1

2

3

4

5

37. Overall, our information
assets are secure.

1

2

3

4

5

38. Overall, the level of
information security
supports our business
functions adequately.

1

2

3

4

5

Position of the person I
report directly to:
Less than US$1 million
US$1 – 9 million
US$10 – 99 million
US$100 million – 1billion
Greater than US$1billion

Number of employees
in company:

Industry:

1 – 99
100 – 499
500 – 1499
1500 – 9999
10,000 – 49,000
More than 50,000

Thank You!
Next, Please do these…

Insert this questionnaire in the supplied postage-prepaid envelope and mail it back to us.
Write your company name on the attached postage-prepaid notification postcard and drop it in the mail
so that we will know you have responded and will not follow up with you unnecessarily. To ensure your
anonymity, please do not put it into the return envelope with the questionnaire.
Thank you very much for your participation in our research project! If you want to share your insights into
information security issues or to make suggestions regarding this questionnaire, please comment below.

Andy Wu, Department of MIS, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-0014 • (407) 580-4198 • SecurityStudy@gmail.com

Definitions

The organizational unit inside your company that implements and manages information security,
regardless of its name or location in the organizational chart.

Security Organization:

Business Units/Other Departments: All other organizational units inside your company aside from the security organization,
whether they are revenue-generating units (production, sales, etc.) or support functions (accounting, legal, etc.).

APPENDIX D: ONLINE SURVEY INTERFACE
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